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CEO pay is a controversial issue in America but there was a time, often 
overlooked today, when chief executives were not paid nearly as much as they 
are now.  From 1940 to the mid-1970s executive pay was modest by today’s 
standards even though U.S. business was generally thriving.  What worked to 
keep executive pay in check?  Economist Thomas Piketty and others credit high 
marginal income tax rates, leading to calls for a return to a similar tax regime.  
This paper casts doubt on the impact tax had and also shows that neither the 
configuration of boards nor shareholder activism played a significant role in 
constraining executive pay.  It emphasizes instead the roles played by strong 
unions, a different and more circumscribed market for managerial talent, and 
social norms, explanations that do not easily lend themselves to generating 
modern policy prescriptions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a substantial consensus that something is seriously amiss with 
executive pay, as the compensation of top executives of U.S. public companies 
is widely perceived as scandalously generous.
1
  Critics of executive pay can be 
found even amongst stout defenders of free markets.
2
  For instance, Richard 
Posner, a law and economics pioneer before he became a federal appellate 
judge, said in 2010 that the proposition that executive pay was excessive was 
“accepted not only by many leading scholars but by almost the entire nation, 
including many chief executive officers.”3   
Critics of executive pay often draw upon history for support, noting 
that the CEOs of today are much better paid than their counterparts of a half-
century ago.
4
  Being a chief executive may be challenging.  Still, when the job 
is the basically the same one it was during the mid-20
th
 century, how can it be 
that CEO pay has increased substantially quicker than gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, total shareholder returns, corporate earnings and the wages of 
ordinary employees?
5
   
The dramatic growth in executive pay has not occurred in a vacuum.  
Managerial compensation has generated substantial controversy and criticism 
for at least a quarter-century
6
 and various reforms have periodically been 
introduced in response, seemingly to little avail.  As the Wall Street Journal 
observed in 2006, “critics tried to slow skyrocketing pay through regulations, 
legislation and shareholder pressure.  Few of their tactics worked.  Many 
backfired.”7  For those perplexed or frustrated that efforts at reform have failed 
to reverse dramatic increases in executive pay, history may provide valuable 
lessons.  “The quarter-century ending in 1970 was a time of unparalleled 
                                                 
1  Michael Skapinker, It is Time for a Brave CEO to ask for Lower, Simpler Pay, FIN. 
TIMES, May 21, 2015, 14.    
2  Id. 
3  Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What if Anything Should 
be Done About It? [2010] DUKE L.J. 1013, 1013-14. 
4  See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, The CEO Backlash, WASH. POST, June 22, 2015 
(putting into context a backlash against CEO pay by indicating that the ratio of CEO pay to the 
pay of rank and file workers was dramatically higher than it was in 1965); Top Executive Pay 
Deserves Greater Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, August 8, 2015, 9 (ditto).     
5  Top Executive Pay, supra note xx (total shareholder return); MICHAEL B. DORFF, 
INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS:  WHY THE CEO EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 19, 
25, 147-48 (2014) (other variables).  We provide additional data on executive pay trends in Part 
II of the paper.   
6  Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:  Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 673, 702 (2005) (“Executive 
compensation is one of the most controversial topics in corporate governance”); Paul Taylor, 
When the Boss Feels Like a Million Dollars, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, 9 (indicating that what 
had been an interest in what top senior executives were paid was changing to a “fascination.)  
7  Joann S. Lublin and Scott Thurm, Behind Soaring Executive Pay, Decades of Failed 
Restraints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, A1.    
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success for American business.”8  Nevertheless, during the middle decades of 
the 20
th
 century, CEOs of U.S. public companies not only were paid less along 
various measures than their present-day counterparts, but executive 
compensation failed to keep up with inflation and executives lost ground as 
compared to rank-and-file employees.  What “worked” to constrain executive 
pay?  This is the topic we explore in this paper.   
Others have identified the shift from (relatively) modest mid-20
th
 
century executive compensation to stratospheric CEO pay by the century’s 
closing stages as a topic worth investigating.  Paul Krugman said nearly 15 
years ago that “The explosion in CEO pay over the past 30 years is an amazing 
story in its own right, and an important one.”9  Michael Dorff wrote similarly in 
2014 that “[t]his major shift provides an opportunity to probe the inner 
workings of CEO pay.”10  Research on point nevertheless is just beginning.  
Carola Frydman, who has analyzed empirically 20
th
 century executive pay 
trends in considerable detail,
11
 observed in a 2010 survey of CEO pay “the 
causes of the apparent regime change in CEO compensation…remain largely 
unknown.”12 
Explaining the “regime change” that disrupted mid-20th century CEO 
pay has important present-day policy ramifications.  Thomas Piketty, in his 
much publicized 2014 tome Capital in the Twenty-First Century, detailed 
historical changes in the concentration of income and wealth and offered policy 
prescriptions designed to reverse growing inequality on both fronts.
13
  In so 
doing he argued that imposing high individual marginal income tax rates may 
be “the only way to stem the observed increase in very high salaries.”14  He 
suggested that the optimal top marginal tax rate would be above 80 percent,
15
 a 
policy recommendation that became increasingly controversial as the popularity 
of his Capital book grew.
16
  Piketty bolstered his argument with historical 
                                                 
8  DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT:  HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID 
AND HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA 42 (1993). 
9  Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, E62. 
10  DORFF, supra note xx, 6.   
11  See, for example, Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New 
View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. ST. 2099 (2010); Carola Frydman 
and Raven Molloy, Pay Cuts for the Boss: Executive Compensation in the 1940s, 72 J. ECON. 
HIST. 225 (2012).   
12  Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75, 81 
(2010). 
13  THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
14  Id., at 512. 
15  Id., at 640 n. 50 (82%).  See also Thomas Piketty et al., Optimal taxation of Top Labor 
Incomes:  A Tale of Three Elasticities, 6 AM. ECON. J:  ECON POL’Y 230, 267, tbl. 5 (83%). 
16  See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, What Debate on Inequality is Missing, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2015, at B1; Debby Wu, Taiwan’s Titans of Industry Take on “Capital” author Piketty, NIKKEI 
ASIAN REV., Nov. 27, 2014; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Mulally v. Piketty:  The Great Inequality 
Theorist Offers a Shallow Analysis of CEO Pay, WALL ST. J., April 22, 2014, available at 
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evidence, attributing a late 20
th
 century surge in the income of top earners in the 
U.S., including CEOs, to substantial cuts to income tax rates that began in the 
1970s and were pronounced in the 1980s.
17
  He argued that if the intention is to 
stop the “stratospheric pay of supermanagers”, then “only dissuasive taxation of 
the sort applied in the United States and Britain before 1980 can do the job.”18 
Piketty’s argument is certainly plausible.  If, due to high marginal 
income tax rates, executives keep very little of what they earn, executives might 
well be prepared to leave substantial money “on the table” because they know 
that they will only be able to retain a small fraction of what they have earned.  
This should in turn dampen pressure public companies might otherwise feel to 
pay management generously.  Still, is Piketty’s invocation of history 
appropriate?   
We argue no.  Tax did not “do the job” with executive pay during the 
middle decades of the 20
th
 century in the way Piketty implies.  Other factors 
instead were equally or more important.  Powerful unions exerted downwards 
pressure on executive pay.  Managerial bargaining power was muted by limited 
job mobility and a perception that the managerial function was bureaucratic in 
orientation and correspondingly undeserving of exceptional rewards.  Perhaps 
most crucially there were norms militating against “moneygrubbing” by top 
executives that functioned as a potent check on executive pay.  
What are the policy implications of our findings?  We are not seeking 
to identify in the past some sort of ideal executive pay model.  Instead, our 
study provides insights regarding tools that could be deployed to restructure 
executive compensation should the political will develop to limit CEO pay 
substantially.  One might wonder, for instance, if it would be possible to revise 
perceptions of top management to accord with those prevalent in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s or resurrect norms within companies strongly biased against 
greedy, grasping executives.  Simply turning back the clock, however, is 
impossible.  For instance, to the extent that mid-20
th
 century norms constrained 
executive pay, these were shaped by the economic chaos of the Depression and 
the challenges of World War II, neither of which we would like to experience 
again.  Moreover, top executives are perceived of differently now than they 
were in the mid-20
th
 century, in the sense that their contribution to corporate 
success is thought of as being more critical.  That means mid-20
th
 century 
remuneration packages where performance-related pay was largely an 
afterthought are unlikely to be acceptable today..  This in turn has important 
implications for the level of executive pay because a logical trade-off with a 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303825604579517442982061548; Robert J. 
Shiller, Better Insurance Against Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2014, at BU6. 
17  PIKETTY, supra note xx, at 508-512. 
18  Id., at 417, 512. 
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managerial compensation scheme where much of the pay is “at risk” is a highly 
lucrative upside if all goes well.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Part II provides an overview of the 
history of executive pay since the 1930s.  It focuses primarily on a mid-20
th
 
century era of comparatively modest managerial compensation that began to 
unravel in the 1970s and was displaced fully in the 1980s in a way that set the 
scene for dramatic increases in executive pay occurring in the 1990s.  Part III 
describes how efforts to respond to executive pay controversies arising over the 
past quarter century have failed to “work” in the sense that CEO compensation 
has remained high and criticism of executive pay remains vocal.  The remainder 
of the paper deals primarily with the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, with 
the objective being to explain what “did the job” during this era of executive 
pay moderation.  Part IV considers the contribution that tax policy made to 
managerial compensation trends, focusing particularly on the question whether 
executive pay trends during the mid-20
th
 century were chiefly a product of high 
marginal tax rates on income in place at that time.  Part V analyzes other 
plausible explanations of what “worked” with executive pay.  Some, such as 
board structure, shareholder intervention and federal wage controls had at best a 
minor role to play.  Others, including union power, the market for managerial 
talent and corporate culture (“norms”) do help to account for the configuration 
of executive pay during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, with the latter 
two factors being of particular importance.  Part VI concludes.   
II. THE FACTS OF EXECUTIVE PAY:  THE 1930S TO TODAY 
To set the scene for analysis of what “worked” with executive pay 
during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century we consider now the evolution of 
executive compensation since the 1930s, with particular reference to the period 
from 1940 to the 1990s.  We focus primarily on identifying trends governing 
overall executive pay, though we also consider how pay was structured.  Our 
summary is not exhaustive; it seeks merely to provide sufficient detail to put 
our subsequent analysis into proper context.   
Railways aside, prior to the 20
th
 century, corporations were almost 
always run either by men with large ownership stakes or by their 
representatives.
19
  After a merger wave at the turn of the 20
th
 century started to 
disperse ownership in major industrial corporations,
20
 salaried executives 
lacking a meaningful ownership interest began taking up top managerial posts 
                                                 
19  See Harwell Wells, No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year:  The Fight Over 
Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 689, 695-702. 
20  Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure:  The United States 
and Germany at the Turn of the 20th Century, 51 AMER. J. COMP. L. 473 (2003). 
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with great frequency.
21
  Executive pay became a public issue as the 1930s 
began due to revelations that cast a harsh light on compensation practices 
during difficult economic times.  Lawsuits and Congressional hearings revealed 
that top executives at three major firms, Bethlehem Steel, American Tobacco, 
and National City Bank, had each been paid more than $1,000,000 a year in 
1929 or 1930.
 22
  These apparently were exceptional cases.
23
  Still, in the midst 
of the Great Depression the image of a greedy corporate president and his 
million-dollar pay package became fixed in the public mind, with many, if not 
most, Americans believing executives were paid “too much.”24   
Dissatisfaction with executive pay in the 1930s sparked a series of 
reform proposals, the most consequential of which required the disclosure of 
executive pay of publicly listed companies under newly enacted federal 
securities laws.
25
  Evidence compiled from disclosures made to the federal 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggests that from 1936 to 1940 
executive pay increased appreciably even after inflation.
 26
  This pattern, 
however, would soon change.  During the 1940s executive compensation saw 
“the sharpest drop . . . in at least the past 70 years, and possibly even longer.”27  
In a 2012 study of compensation at large public manufacturing firms during this 
decade, Carola Frydman and Raven Saks Malloy found that in real terms the 
average pre-tax compensation for a firm’s three highest-paid executives 
dropped by 8% and after-tax earnings fell 24%.
28
  Correspondingly, the median 
executive in Frydman and Molloy’s sample received in 1949 17 times the pay 
of the average worker, compared with 24 in 1940.
29
  This was one aspect of a 
“Great Compression” in wages in the United States at mid-century, 
characterized by a decreasing distance between the wages of lower and higher-
paid workers.
30
   
                                                 
21  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE:  THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 
85 (1990).   
22  See generally Wells, No Man, supra note xx. 
23  JOHN CALHOUN BAKER, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND BONUS PLANS 261 (1938) 
(indicating that as of 1932 the median compensation for a president in a sample of 100 industrial 
companies was only $41,833, equivalent to $728,000 currently).   
24  Big Salaries, FORTUNE, Apr. 1936, at 215 (citing polling data indicating that 54.5% of 
Americans felt this way). 
25   On the fact that dissatisfaction with executive pay was the catalyst for introduction of 
disclosure regulation see Wells, No Man, supra note xx at 741-44; Murphy, Executive 
Compensation, supra note xx, 251; Sandra L. Suárez, Symbolic Politics and the Regulation of 
Executive Compensation:  A Comparison of the Great Depression and the Great Recession, 42 
POL. & SOC’Y 73, 89 (2014).   
26  Frydman and Saks, supra note xx, at 2107 (Fig. 1). 
27   Frydman and Molloy, Pay Cuts, supra note xx, 225. 
28  Id. at 239. The authors report the composition of their sample “is similar to that of 
manufacturing firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange.” Id. at 229. 
29  Id. at 227. 
30  Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the 
United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1-2 (1992). 
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Executives did somewhat better in the 1950s and 1960s in that their 
compensation did not shrink in real terms.  Still, executive pay barely budged 
even though this was an era when “U.S. business stood triumphant at home and 
abroad.”31  According to a 2010 study by Frydman and Saks which uniquely 
provides data on executive pay using a uniform methodology for the decades 
we focus on, between 1950 and 1975 executive compensation only grew, after 
inflation was taken into account, by an average of 0.8% annually.
32
  The mid-
20
th
 century wage “Great Compression” correspondingly continued, as 
illustrated by the fact that between 1959 and 1968 the pay of a chief executive 
of a company with sales of $400 million or more rose 14% as compared with 
39% for manufacturing employees overall.
33
  Moreover, the $1 million 
executive was nowhere to be found.  Industry’s first “Millionaire Club” only 
took form in 1977 when the total compensation of the five best paid CEOs in 
the U.S. exceeded $1 million a year.
34
     
While overall levels of executive pay barely budged in real terms from 
1950 through to the 1970s, some changes were occurring with the composition 
of executives’ pay.  During the 1940s, executive compensation was 
overwhelmingly composed of salary and bonuses based on annual targets.
35
  
Due in large measure to tax changes occurring in 1950,
36
 over the next decade 
the fraction of executives holding stock options jumped from 10% to 60% and 
the grant-date value of stock options awarded rose from 10% to over 20% of 
total executive compensation.
37
  Nevertheless, stock options grants “remained 
too small to have much of an impact on median pay levels until the late 
1970s.”38  Similarly, while deferred compensation such as pensions and 
perquisites such as expense accounts became important parts of compensation 
in the 1950s, the value of such fringe benefits was not substantial enough to 
                                                 
31  Lublin and Thurm, Behind, supra note xx; LOUIS GALAMBOS AND JOSEPH PRATT, THE 
RISE OF THE CORPORATE COMMONWEALTH:  UNITED STATES BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 
20TH CENTURY 183 (1988).   
32  Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2099-2100 (unique nature of Frydman and Saks’s 
data), 2107 (1950-75 data).  The evidence cited related to pre-tax compensation, but they report 
broadly similar trends after-tax. Id. at 2110.  Wilbur Lewellen found that between 1940 and 1963 
average before-tax compensation for senior executives increased 80%. WILBUR LEWELLEN, 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS 8 (1968). Frydman and Saks 
persuasively argue, however, that this greatly overstates growth due to the use of a peculiar (pre-
Black-Scholes) method for valuing stock options as compensation. See Frydman & Saks, supra 
note xx, at 2108-09 & n.15. 
33  Arch Patton, Are We Sabotaging Executive Motivation?, MCKINSEY Q., June 1970, 52, 
55, 57. 
34  Donald B. Thompson, Advent of 7-Figure CEO Prompts Questions, CHI. TRIB., May 
31, 1981, N1; Cf. Other Business; The Million Dollar Sure Thing, N.Y. Times, January 24, 1982, 
at A23 (indicating Henry Ford II became the first million dollar executive in 1978).  
35  Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2106-07. 
36  See infra note xx and related discussion.   
37  Murphy, supra note xx, at 51 [SSRN version]. 
38  Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 81.  
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change the general conclusion that executive compensation grew anaemically 
during the 1950s and 1960s.
39
 
This stagnation continued into the early 1970s.
40
  A 1976 article in the 
Harvard Business Review, citing data indicating executive pay fell 20% as a 
multiple of hourly workers’ income between 1964 and 1974, referred to a 
“pinch on executive pay” that was resulting in a “devaluation of the American 
executive.”41  However, between 1973 and 1979 the median cash compensation 
for CEOs in the Forbes 800 did increase by 12.2% each year when annual 
inflation was 8.5%.
42
  Moreover, by the end of the 1970s executive pay 
seemingly had begun a “regime change” from stagnancy to rapid growth.43  It is 
impossible to pinpoint the exact moment that executive pay began to increase 
substantially.
44
  Various observers, however, have pegged the second half of the 
1970s as the beginning of the acceleration that characterized the rest of the 
century.
 45
  A 1977 McKinsey Quarterly report substantiates this verdict, as it 
indicated executive compensation had risen dramatically in 1976 and quoted a 
New York Times story that said “The restraints are coming off.  It is a time to 
grab” to drive home the point.46   
Regardless of precisely what happened when in the 1970s, in the 1980s 
executive compensation rose rapidly.  Newsweek reported in 1991 that “CEO 
pay rose dramatically all through the 1980s -- 212 percent… -- four times faster 
than pay for ordinary workers.”47  The Economist said in 1992 “Chief 
executives’ pay soared throughout the 1980s.”48  According to financial 
economists Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy all executives were doing up to 
this point was “catching up.”49  In urging public companies to do more to link 
CEO pay with corporate performance they argued that, despite headlines to the 
contrary, top executives were not receiving record salaries and bonuses.
50
  To 
make their point Jensen and Murphy provided data indicating that in 1986 
dollars CEOs of larger companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
                                                 
39  Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2109. 
40  See infra section V.__. 
41  David Kraus, The “Devaluation” of the American Executive, HARV. BUS. REV., May-
June, 1976, 84, 85.   
42  Murphy, supra note xx, at 56 (at 260 in published version).   
43  Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2101. 
44   On the difficulty of telling what was going on in the late 1970s, see Detlev Vagts, 
Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts? 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 247 
(1983).     
45  Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 83; DORFF, supra note xx, 18, 24.   
46  McLaughlin, Surging Executive, MCKINSEY Q., Autumn 1977, 46, 47 (citing When the 
Boss Gets a Raise, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1977, Magazine, 47).   
47  The Pay Police, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1991, 44.  
48  Worthy of His Hire?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1992, 19. 
49  Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much You 
Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May/June 1990, 138, 139.    
50  Id., 138.  
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were paid more in the mid-1930s (an average of $882,000) than they were from 
1982 through 1988 ($843,000).
51
  Nevertheless, even if Jensen and Murphy 
were correct that 1980s executives were merely “catching up”, the fact that 
their CEO pay figure for 1982-88 was substantially higher than the equivalent 
figure for 1974 to 1981 ($642,000) indicated clearly how much things were 
changing.
52
 
Executive pay increases occurring in the 1980s served as a prelude to 
even more dramatic growth in the 1990s that would drive CEO pay up to 
unprecedented levels.  Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter found that median 
compensation for an S&P 500 CEO rose from $2.2m in 1992 to $7.2m in 
2001.
53
  Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein, looking at a similar cohort but 
focusing instead on average (mean) CEO compensation found it “climbed from 
$3.7m in 1993 to $9.1m in 2003,” a 146% increase.54  
The dramatic growth in CEO pay was accompanied by other executive 
compensation trends.  One was that, despite Jensen and Murphy’s argument 
that there was little reason to be concerned about how much executives were 
paid, sustained and widespread criticism of lucrative CEO pay emerged for the 
first time since the 1930s.  The trend became evident in the 1980s, driven by a 
takeover boom that meant, at least according to the media, workers were being 
laid off while dismissed executives were being rewarded with lucrative “golden 
parachute” severance payments.55  It crescendoed in the early 1990s, with 
exposés of executive compensation appearing at the same time as articles 
comparing U.S. CEOs’ compensation to that of their lower-paid, yet ostensibly 
more successful, foreign counterparts.
56
  
A second important trend was greater emphasis on linking pay with 
performance.  The case that Jensen and Murphy made in this regard helped to 
convert many to the idea that executive pay should be designed to ensure 
“agents” (i.e., senior executives) had their incentives aligned with those of their 
“principals” (i.e., shareholders).57  This reasoning, possibly combined with tax 
                                                 
51  Id., 143.   
52  Id., 144.   
53  Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 78 (Table 1). 
54  Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXF. REV. ECON. 
POL. 283, 285 (2005) (measured ex ante).  On the significance of differences between 
mean/average and median compensation in this particular context, see Frydman & Jenter, supra 
note xx, at 78. 
55  See Murphy, supra note xx, at 63-69. 
56  See, e.g., GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF 
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991); Peter Passell, Those Big Executive Salaries May Mask a Bigger 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 1992) A1. 
57  On the impact of this reasoning, see, for example, Simon Holberton, Why Performance 
Should be the Most Crucial Element, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 1990; Charles M. Yablon, Bonus 
Questions--Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
271, 279 (1999) (“Jensen and Murphy’s article was extremely influential”); Frank Dobbin and 
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reforms made in 1993 that created incentives for companies to use 
performance-oriented pay,
58
 helped to prompt a reorientation in pay in favor of 
stock options and later long-term incentive plans with targets related to 
corporate performance.
59
  Only 16% of CEO compensation in S&P 500 
companies was performance based in the 1970s, but the proportion grew to 
26% in the 1980s and 47% in the 1990s.
60
 
The shift towards performance-oriented pay in the 1990s likely helps to 
explain the substantial increase in aggregate executive compensation.
61
  
Executives have various reasons to dislike having their pay tied closely to 
stockholder-related measures of corporate performance such as share prices and 
total shareholder return.  These include fears that pay will fluctuate 
dramatically in accordance with changing corporate fortunes, concerns about 
pay falling substantially due to factors beyond the control of the executives 
(e.g. general stock market trends) and investment-related apprehension about 
tying pay to the performance of the company in which they have already tied up 
virtually all of their human capital.
62
  For companies that want to link to pay 
with performance but also want to assuage managerial doubts, the obvious 
solution is to structure executive compensation to provide for a highly lucrative 
upside if all goes well.
63
  Empirical analysis indeed reveals that between 1980 
and 2005 increases in the level of executive pay were driven in large measure 
by the growing use of performance-oriented managerial compensation.
 64
  
Managerial attitudes aside, the shift towards performance-oriented pay in the 
1990s drove executive pay upwards because the stock market rose substantially 
in buoyant economic conditions.  As Time observed in 1997, “it is that bull 
market that has turned millions upon millions of stock options into pure CEO 
gold, in cartloads unforeseen by anyone.”65   
Due to the bursting of a “dot-com” fuelled stock market bubble and 
corporate governance scandals such as Enron and WorldCom share prices fell 
                                                                                                                       
Dirk Zorn Corporate Malfeasance and the Myth of Shareholder Value, (2005) 17 POL. POWER & 
SOC. THEORY 179, 189.  Jensen was a pioneering proponent of principal/agent theory in the 
context of the public company:  Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
58  Infra notes xx to xx and related discussion. 
59  Murphy, supra note xx, at 72-88. Murphy has a multi-causal explanation for the 
growing use of stock options in the 1990s, including favorable accounting rules and relatively lax 
disclosure regulation. 
60  Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 80 (Table 2a). 
61  Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2103. 
62  DORFF, supra note xx, 85-86; BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW:  THEORY, 
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 686-87 (1997).  
63  CHEFFINS, supra note xx, 687-88.  
64  Frydman and Saks, supra note xx, at 2130 (reporting that the growth in the level of 
executive pay was explained partly if not fully by the strengthening of managerial incentives). 
65  Daniel Kadlec and Bernard Baumohl, Linking the Boss’s Check to the Firm’s Stock 
Price Seemed Reasonable the Market Went Wild, TIME, April 28, 1997.  
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substantially in the early 2000s, which coincided with a modest drop in CEO 
pay.
66
  Chief executive compensation rallied in the mid-2000s before falling 
again in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
67
  Median pay for an S&P 500 
CEO was $9.1m in 2001, dropped to $8.1m in 2005, and then bounced around, 
rising to $9.1m again in 2006 but dropping to $7.4m in 2009 before recovering 
to $9m in 2011.
68
  Median CEO pay crossed the $10 million threshold for the 
first time in history in 2013
69
 and rose to a record $10.6 million in 2014.
70
   
Even though the dramatic pay increases of the 1990s have not been 
repeated since 2000 a yawning gap remains between a CEO’s pay and that of 
the average worker. The exact details may vary, but, as many Americans are 
aware, whereas CEOs used to make not even 20 times what an average worker 
in their industry made, they now earn roughly 300 times the average worker’s 
wage.
71
  The “compression” of executive pay that characterized U.S. public 
companies during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century correspondingly is no 
more than a dim memory.  
III. EXECUTIVE PAY REFORM – MORE MISSES THAN HITS 
The dramatic growth in executive compensation over the past three and 
a half decades has generated significant controversy.
72
  A variety of reforms 
adopted in response are summarized here.  To anticipate, none have “worked” 
to moderate executive pay in the mid-20
th
 century manner.  Instead, the 
dramatic increases occurring in the 1980s and 1990s have remained entrenched 
because periodic decreases in executive compensation associated with scandals 
and falling share prices have been more than cancelled out by increases in 
better times.  As a 2015 newspaper editorial said, the effort to reform executive 
                                                 
66  Richard A. Lord and Yoshie Saito, Trends in CEO Compensation and Equity Holdings 
for S&P 1500 Firms:  1994-2008, (2010) J. APP. FIN., issue no. 2, 40, 43, 53. 
67  Martin J. Conyon, Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms, 124 
ECON J. F60, F73 (2013). 
68  Murphy, supra note xx, at 97.  Frydman and Saks’s sample (supra note xx) ends in 
2005 so cannot be referred to for this period. 
69  Median Pay Rises Above $10 million in 2013, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2014, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ceo-pay-20140527-story.html. 
70  This Exec is the Highest-Paid American CEO, CBSNEWS.COM (May 26, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/this-exec-is-the-highest-paid-american-ceo/.  
71  Economic Policy Institute Issue Brief 399 (June 21, 2015). The EPI number is based on 
realized, and not estimated, CEO compensation.  For other data see Equilar, Anticipating the 
CEO Pay Ration – CEO Pay vs Median Income, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION BLOG (May 20, 
2015), http://www.equilar.com/blogs/33-ceo-pay-ratio-median-income.html (finding that CEO 
pay to median income pay for the S&P 1500 had increased from 83 to 1 in 2007 to 130 to 1 in 
2014 and the ratio for S&P 500 companies had grown from 206 to 1 in 2007 and 248 to 1 in 
2014); Melanie Trottman, Top CEOs Make 373 Times the Average U.S. Worker, WALL ST. J., 
May 13, 2015, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/05/13/top-ceos-now-make-373-
times-the-average-rank-and-file-worker/ (reporting the results of an AFL-CIO study). 
72  Supra note xx and related discussion.  
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pay practices has been “one of the least successful movements of the past 
decade.”73 
Executive pay critics have certainly not been satisfied.  Instead, they 
are “angry,” and “outraged”,74 with commentators over the past few years 
describing CEO pay packages as “gluttonous,” “shameful,” and “without 
honor.”75  Hillary Clinton chose to attack executive compensation early in her 
current Presidential campaign in an apparent attempt to “strike a populist 
note.”76  Even the former President of the National Association of 
Manufacturers suggested in 2015 that “at a time when our economy is sluggish 
and millions of working Americans are struggling to make ends meet, it is 
unseemly for the lucky few at the top of the corporate pyramid to be taking 
conspicuous advantage of their power.”77 
The most ambitious and the most conspicuously unsuccessful efforts at 
executive pay reform, assuming the objective was to address concerns 
executives were paid too much, were launched in the early 1990s.  Due to a 
combination of rapidly increasing executive pay and recessionary economic 
conditions, managerial remuneration became highly controversial and was an 
issue in the 1992 election campaign.
78
  In this context, significant reforms were 
introduced impacting the disclosure and taxation of executive pay.   
                                                 
73  Editorial, Executive Compensation, Ever Higher, Ever Less Justifiable, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 26, 2015, available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-
platform/editorial-executive-compensation-ever-higher-ever-less-justifiable/article_9ff743e4-
e9fb-507b-93ba-60b969bb4655.html.  
74  DORFF, supra note xx, at 2; Karen Dillon, The Coming Battle Over Executive Pay, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2009), available at https://hbr.org/2009/09/the-coming-battle-over-
executive-pay; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Outrage Over Wall St. Pay, But Shrugs for Silicon 
Valley?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Feb. 18, 2014, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/outrage-over-wall-st-pay-but-shrugs-for-silicon-valley/. 
75  Barry Ritholtz, Executive Pay Gluttony, BLOOMBERGVIEW, April 30, 2015, 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-30/executive-pay-transparency-won-t-lead-to-
reform; Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Stephen Labaton, Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses Shameful, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/business/30obama.html?_r=0; Frank Islam and Ed Crego, 
Profits Without Honor:  The Sad Truth About CEO Compensation, HUFFINGTON POST, April 14, 
2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-islam/profits-without-honor-the_b_7042612.html.  
76  Caren Bohan et al., Hillary Clinton Surprises with Early Attack on CEO Pay, REUTERS, 
April 13, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/13/us-usa-election-clinton-inequality-
idUSKBN0N421620150413.  
77  Jerry Jasinowski, CEOs Should Lead on Pay, HUFFINGTON POST, May 28, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-jasinowski/executive-compensation_b_7459426.html.   
78  Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay:  A Legislative History of Executive 
Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 11, 23 (Randall Thomas and 
Jennifer Hill, eds., 2012). 
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In October 1992 the SEC substantially revamped rules governing 
disclosure of executive pay.
79
  The most dramatic change was mandating that 
companies provide in proxy solicitation documentation circulated to 
shareholders a Summary Compensation Table setting out the major components 
of executive pay the CEO and other highly paid executives had received over 
the previous three years. The purpose was to provide investors with an easily 
understood overview of executive pay in a single location.
80
  Additional tables 
describing in much greater detail payment in the form of stock options were 
also required.
81
  
Tax law was also deployed.  Compensation has to be “reasonable” to 
qualify for deduction under the income tax.
82
  Newly elected President Bill 
Clinton proposed in 1993 to define all compensation above $1 million as 
unreasonable, and therefore, non-deductible, before backing off so that the 
deduction would only be denied to pay above this level that was not 
performance related.
83
  As enacted in Section 162(m), amounts paid in excess 
of $1 million to the CEO and the four highest-paid executives of a public 
corporation were deemed non-deductible unless the pay was based on 
performance goals that were determined by a compensation committee 
comprised of independent directors and approved by a vote of shareholders.
84
 
Despite the reforms occurring in the early 1990s, executive 
compensation sky-rocketed for the remainder of the decade.
85
  Indeed, the 
regulatory initiatives may have had the unintended consequence of accelerating 
the process.  For instance, various observers have hypothesized that the 
toughening of disclosure rules in 1992 helped to foster the dramatic upward 
spiral of executive pay in the 1990s.
86
  Why would this have happened?  A 
2006 New York Times story entitled “Disclosure Won’t Tame CEO Pay” 
captures the logic: 
“History suggests that whenever (chief executives) discover a fellow 
CEO is getting something they don’t have, they make a grab for it.  In other 
                                                 
79  Executive Compensation Disclosure (1992) 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126.  For a summary, see 
Marlo A. Bakris, Executive Compensation Disclosure:  The SEC's Newest Weapon in its Arsenal 
Against Executive Compensation Abuse, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 105 (1993). 
80  CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW, supra note xx, 677. 
81  Murphy, supra note xx, at 15.   
82  I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Aaron S. J. Zelinsky, Comment, Taxing Unreasonable 
Compensation:  § 162(a)(1) and Managerial Power, 119 YALE L. J. 637, 638 (2009). 
83  Murphy, supra note xx, at 23-24; Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform:  The Derivatives 
Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 301, 302 (1995). 
84  I.R.C. § 162(m). 
85  Supra note xx to xx and related discussion.   
86  Lublin and Thurm, Behind Soaring, supra note xx; Nocera, Disclosure, supra note xx.   
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words, as laudable as more disclosure is, there is a real possibility it will make a 
bad situation worse”.87   
To elaborate, due to disclosure, both managers and board members who 
set executive pay can find out readily the “market rate” offered by 
competitors.
88
  Executives who become aware they are paid less than their peers 
at other companies seek adjustments and the directors who set their pay will 
tend to be sympathetic because of a belief the management team is not “below 
average” and might defect to rivals offering more generous terms.   
The $1 million deductibility cap was similarly problematic.  It, in 
effect, may have been treated as an implicit endorsement of CEO pay of at least 
$1 million annually, thereby prompting companies paying less to play catch 
up.
89
  Moreover, since performance-related pay will tend to correlate with 
higher executive pay,
90
 the 1993 tax change, by providing companies with a tax 
incentive to rely extensively on performance-based pay, may have helped drive 
the huge compensation numbers in the ensuing years.
91
  The fact that many 
bonus payments regarded as performance based for the purposes of Section 
162(m) were only weakly tied to performance likely compounded the 
problem.
92
  Even if Section 162(m) was not a catalyst for the rapid growth of 
executive pay in the 1990s,
93
 it does not appear to have done anything to stem 
the tide.  
There was little additional executive pay regulation reform throughout 
the remainder of the 1990s but various changes have been made since the early 
2000s.  None, however, has apparently had a substantial impact on the amount 
executives are paid or is likely to do so in the future.  For instance, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 mandated the “clawback” of performance-based 
compensation that was paid based on financial information that ultimately 
                                                 
87  Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won’t Tame CEO Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006.    
88  DORFF, supra note xx, 194-95; Brian Cheffins & Randall Thomas, The Globalization 
(Americanization) of Executive Pay, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 232, 272 (2004). 
89  Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 917-920 (2007); Tod Perry & Mark Zenner, Pay for Performance?  
Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 460 
(2001). 
90  Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.   
91  Murphy, supra note xx, at 25; Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents:  
Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 
524, 525 (2009); Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free:  Taxing 
Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 410 (2008).   
92  LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 135 (2004).   
93  For studies failing to find much of a causal link see, Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. 
Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y AND THE ECON. 1, 3 (2000); 
Nancy L. Rose and Catherine D. Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay:  Using the Tax Code to 
Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LABOR ECON. S138, S166 (2002). 
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proved to be erroneous, while the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required companies 
to implement and enforce policies for recouping such payments made to 
executives.
94
  Executive pay expert Kevin Murphy has said that the rules are 
“notable mostly for (their) ineffectiveness,”95 which is not surprising given that 
clawback schemes seemingly do little to align pay with performance or contain 
executive pay increases.
96
  
The expansion of the clawback rules was just one feature of Dodd-
Frank dealing with executive pay.
97
  A much more heavily publicized change 
related to “say-on-pay.”  As Part V.A.2 discusses, there have for many years 
been requirements that shareholders approve specified features of executive 
compensation.  Under Dodd Frank, shareholders of public companies were 
given the right for the first time to vote on executive pay policy in its entirety.
98
  
Corporations, however, were only required to offer a “say-on-pay” vote once 
every three years and the outcome of the votes was deemed to be merely 
advisory.
99
  These features may help to explain say-on-pay’s modest impact.  In 
the five proxy seasons from 2011 through 2015, fewer than 3 percent of all 
shareholder say-on-pay votes at Russell 3000 corporations were negative.
100
  
There is some evidence that the high approval rates have occurred partly due to 
boards modifying compensation plans to head off possible negative 
recommendations,
101
 but at least one study has found that such modifications 
were accompanied by offsetting changes that resulted in higher overall 
executive pay.
102
   
Board structure was another executive compensation topic Dodd Frank 
addressed.  The Act stipulated that the SEC should require national stock 
exchanges to provide in their listing rules that public companies must establish 
compensation committees staffed by independent directors.
103
  This was hardly 
a radical change.  As far back as 2000, nearly four out of five S&P 500 
companies had a compensation committee comprised entirely of independent 
                                                 
94  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §304, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Dodd-
Frank § 954.   
95  Murphy, supra note xx, at 29. 
96  See, e.g., Jesse Fried and Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L 722 
(2011). 
97  Dodd-Frank, Title IX, subtitle E.   
98  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-90 (2010).   
99  Dodd Frank § 951(c). 
100  See SEMLER BROSSY, 2015 SAY ON PAY RESULTS RUSSELL 3000, Sept. 28, 2015, 
http://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2015-SOP-Report-2015-09-28.pdf.    
101  DORFF, supra note xx, at 245. 
102  Mathias Kronland & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive 
Compensation?  Evidence from Say-on-Pay Voting 6 (April 15, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358696.   
103  Dodd Frank § 952. 
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directors.
104
  Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange has required since 2003 
that companies listed on the Exchange have a compensation committees staffed 
by independent directors.
105
    
Dodd-Frank also required expanded disclosure of executive 
compensation.  Most controversially, the Act provided that the SEC should 
introduce rules requiring an issuer to disclose the ratio between its CEO’s total 
compensation and the median total compensation for all of the company’s other 
employees.
106
  With the SEC only having implemented the relevant rules in 
2015 and with companies not needing to make the relevant disclosures until 
2018,
107
 it is too early to gauge the impact of reform. Still, it seems unlikely pay 
ratio disclosure will substantially change existing practices.  As one 
commentator opined,  
“[t]he idea behind publishing the ratio of executive pay to worker pay 
seems to be that the disparity will embarrass corporate boards and anger 
investors into cutting back on executive pay.  Sounds good.  But I don't see that 
happening. If there was anger and embarrassment over CEO salaries, those 
salaries already would be cut. As long as CEOs deliver, what is the incentive to 
cut their pay?”108 
The dramatic acceleration of executive pay that occurred in the 1990s 
may have ceased.  Nevertheless, executive pay has, for the most part, continued 
to increase since the early 2000s.
109
  Correspondingly, it seems fair to say that 
reform efforts of the past 25 years have yielded many more misses than hits.  
And so the question this paper focuses on naturally arises:  why, given the 
dramatic growth in executive pay as the 20
th
 century drew to a close, was 
managerial compensation flat for a number of decades prior to that, decades in 
which American business was performing well?  What, in other words, 
                                                 
104  Vidhi Chhaocchharia and Yaniv Grinstein, The Changing Structure of US Corporate 
Boards:  1997-2003, 15 CORP. GOV. INT’L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2007). 
105  Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 WYOMING L. REV. 
129, 157 (2006). 
106  Dodd Frank § 953(b).  Section 953(a) also directed the SEC to enhance rules governing 
disclosure of the link between pay and performance.  In 2015 the SEC issued proposed rules on 
point Implementation seems unlikely to have a marked effect on executive pay.  Steven A. Bank 
& George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES ___ 
(forthcoming). 
107  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, 
August 5, 2015, http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html; Dodd-Frank CEO Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rules Approved, NAT’L. L. REV., Aug. 10, 2015, available at 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/dodd-frank-ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure-rules-approved 
(accessed Sept. 17, 2015).  
108  Paul Sassone, High CEO Pay Isn’t America’s Problem, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2015, 
available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/evanston/lifestyles/ct-evr-sassone-ceo-pay-
tl-0820-20150813-story.html.   
109  Supra note xx and related discussion.  
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“worked” to compress executive pay?  We begin our analysis by considering 
the role of tax, in large measure because of Thomas Piketty’s high-profile 
recommendation that high marginal tax rates be introduced to bring executive 
pay under control.
110
   
IV. TAXATION AND EXECUTIVE PAY 
A. Higher Tax Rates as a Potential Cure for Executives Being Paid “Too 
Much” 
While Piketty is perhaps the most prominent commentator to have 
suggested that a solution to unduly lucrative executive pay is to raise income 
tax rates, he is by no means the only one.  As far back as 1993 former Harvard 
law professor and President Derek Bok made this argument.
111
  Richard Posner 
did likewise in a 2010 law review article on executive pay
112
 as have various 
academics
113
 and media commentators.
114
  
These calls to raise top income tax rates to rein in executive pay are 
implicitly based on the assumption that executives take into account the costs 
and benefits associated with negotiating lucrative compensation and tax will be 
a cost that will deter them from taking full advantage of leverage they otherwise 
have.  Piketty refers to the logic involved as a “bargaining power 
hypothesis.”115  To elaborate, significantly higher marginal tax rates can 
diminish substantially the after-tax benefits of the additional dollars executives 
obtain from managerial compensation.  As the net benefit decreases, the costs 
become more salient and executives theoretically will conclude that the pursuit 
of additional dollars is not worth whatever social capital has to be expended to 
obtain those dollars.
116
  Executive pay moderation will follow in due course.  
Developments occurring during the middle of the 20
th
 century provide an 
opportunity to test whether this theory holds up in practice.   
                                                 
110  Supra note xx and accompanying text.   
111  BOK, supra note xx, 275. 
112  Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, supra note xx, 1046.   
113  See, for example, Robert B. Reich, CEOs Deserve Their Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 
2007, A13; Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishel, The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial 
Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 57, 74 
(2013); Mullane, supra note xx, at 551-52; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY:  WHAT CAN BE 
DONE? 185 (2015) (arguing a top rate of 65 percent would be optimal).  See also David I. Walker, 
A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 93 B.U. L. REV. 325, 346 (2013) (proposing the 
combination of an executive pay surtax and investor tax relief). 
114  Robert H. Frank, Why Big Paydays Aren’t All Bad, NEWSWEEK, March 30, 2009, at 27; 
Jon Talton, Changes in Public Policy Could Put a Lid on Executives’ Excessive Pay Packages, 
SEATTLE TIMES, June 18, 2015, available at http://www.seattletimes.com/business/changes-in-
public-policy-could-put-a-lid-on-executives-excessive-pay-packages/ (proposing a return to the 
70 percent marginal rate of the 1970s). 
115  PIKETTY, supra note xx, at 510. 
116  Id.; ATKINSON, supra note xx, at 186. 
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B. Tax and Executive Pay Levels During the Middle of the 20
th
 Century 
Proving directly that executives respond to higher tax rates by leaving 
money on the table is not feasible because few are privy to the deliberations of 
directors or the negotiations with top management which serve to set executive 
pay.  At least some of those who advocate using tax to solve the executive pay 
“problem” have correspondingly resorted to citing the historical record as 
evidence that tax reform would work.  In particular, they point to a correlation 
from the 1940s through the 1970s between high income tax rates in place then 
and executive pay that was modest by present day standards.  For instance, 
Piketty has cited developments in both the U.S., where the top marginal tax rate 
was 91 percent between 1951 and 1963, and Britain, where the figure was as 
high as 98 percent between the 1950s and 1970s.
117
  According to Piketty,  
“It is always difficult for an executive to truly convince other parties 
involved in the firm . . . that a large pay raise – say of a million dollars – is truly 
justified.  In the 1950s and 1960s, executives in British and US firms had little 
reason to fight for such raises, and other interested parties were less inclined to 
accept them, because 80-90 percent of the increase would in any case go 
directly to the government.”118 
At first glance, the chronology of the top marginal tax rate in the U.S. 
supports Piketty’s logic. As Figure 1 indicates, the top marginal tax rate was 
high from the late 1930s to the 1970s, fell dramatically in the 1980s and 
remained low by mid-20
th
 century standards thereafter.  Executive pay either 
fell or increased only modestly in real terms when the income taxes were high 
and only began to increase substantially when the top marginal tax rate fell.   
Figure 1:  Tax Rates and Median Total Compensation, 1936-2005
119
 
                                                 
117  On the UK tax rates, see MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES:  THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 
IN BRITAIN, 1914-1979 229 (2002). 
118  PIKETTY, supra note xx, at 509-10.  On the British case see also ATKINSON, supra note 
xx, at 186.  
119  For tax rates, adjusted to reflect changes occurring annually see Tax Policy Center, 
Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=543.  The data on the “earned 
rate” reflects the fact that due to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 earned income, such as salary and 
bonuses, was taxed at a lower rate than income from other sources, such as interest and 
dividends, from 1971 to 1981.  See text accompanying note xx infra.  On median total executive 
compensation data, presented as averages over five year periods see Carola Frydman & Raven S. 
Molloy, Full Data Appendix to Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation?  Evidence from 
Postwar Tax Reforms, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1425, 1426 (2011) (Tbl. A5), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/frydman/www/appendix1109.pdf.      
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But was this merely a coincidence?  Or did high marginal income tax 
rates actually cause executives to leave enough money on the table to explain 
the relatively modest executive pay arrangements in place from the 1940s 
through to the 1970s?   
C. How Much Did Tax Matter? 
During the middle decades of the 20
th
 century various observers argued 
that the high marginal tax rates in place put meaningful downward pressure on 
executive compensation.  One practitioner remarked in 1956 that “the no longer 
new, but always awe-inspiring, high plateau of progressive individual incomes 
taxes upon the take-home pay of high priced key personnel” had made 
traditional compensation policies “obsole[te].”120  David Roberts, in a 1959 
study of executive compensation, said the income tax regime was  
“widely credited with partial responsibility for the failure of executive 
earnings gains to keep pace with those in other occupations.  The corporation is 
allegedly discouraged from making increases which add to its costs and confer 
little after taxes benefit upon the executive.”121  
J. Grant Macdonnell of Northrop Aircraft echoed this sentiment, 
concluding in 1960 that “[t]oo often, mere salary increases are meaningless to 
executives in the higher tax brackets.  These executives may retain only 20 to 
                                                 
120  Clarence E. Bonnett, Jr., Compensation Planning for the Executive, 9 TAX EXECUTIVE 
26, 26 (1956). 
121  DAVID R. ROBERTS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 155 (1959). 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1
9
3
6
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
4
1
9
4
8
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
6
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
$
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
%
 
Top Tax Rate Earned Rate Median Total Compensation
 3/16/20162/2/2016 FOR SUBMISSION 
20 LAW REVIEW               [Vol. __:__ 
 
DRAFT – Please do not quote or cite without authors’ permission 
30 cents (or even less) of each dollar of the increase.”122  Likewise, the Wall 
Street Journal reported in 1969 when General Motors shareholders were 
debating a proposal to cap the CEO’s pay that “a wife of one top GM executive 
commented to a friend, ‘They don’t seem to understand that we give 90% of 
earnings back to the government’.”123 
While high income tax rates plausibly could explain why executive pay 
was modest in the mid-20
th
 century by present day standards, the only 
statistically rigorous analysis of the interrelationship between income tax and 
executive pay over an extended period of time indicates that tax policy was not 
pivotal.  In a 2011 empirical study, Carola Frydman and Raven Saks Molloy 
examined the salaries, stock options, and post-retirement bonuses paid to a 
sample of top executives in large corporations between 1946 and 2005 and 
found there was a correlation in the time-series evidence between tax policy 
and the level of executive pay.
124
  While this seemingly implies tax had a 
significant role, Frydman and Molloy failed to find any meaningful link 
between changes in tax rates and changes in pay levels over the short and long-
term.
125
  It seems, then, that neither boards nor executives altered their approach 
to executive pay explicitly in response to the tax regime in place.   
Even with Frydman and Molloy’s time series evidence, the correlation 
between tax policy and executive pay did not hold at all times.  At the 
beginning of the 1970s the top rate of marginal income tax on earned income 
was reduced from 70% to 50% while income from other sources, such as 
interest and dividends, continued to be taxed at a top rate of 70% (Fig. 1).
126
  
Paul Samuelson, a well-known economist, described the change as “the greatest 
thing that ever happened to executives.”127  CEO compensation nevertheless 
increased only modestly in real terms in the decade following,
 128
 even if there 
are some indications an executive pay “regime change” began in the second 
half of the 1970s.
129
  
                                                 
122  J. Grant Macdonnell, A Struggle to Reward Good Executives, 2 CALIF. MGMT REV. 25, 
25 (1960). 
123  About 19% of GM Holders Back Lid on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1969, 5. 
This comment of course reflects a misunderstanding of marginal income tax rates. 
124  Carola Frydman & Raven S. Molloy, Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation?  
Evidence from Postwar Tax Reforms, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1425, 1426 (2011). 
125  Id.  
126  GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, FINANCIAL MOTIVATION FOR EXECUTIVES 185 (1970). 
127  Executive Compensation:  Getting Richer in ‘73, BUS. WK., May 4, 1974, 58.   
128  Frydman & Molloy, supra note xx, at 1427.  This does not mean tax had no effect on 
compensation packages during this era.  Instead, it may well have helped to change the mix of 
compensation, rather than the overall amount.  See Anthony M. Vernava, “Cash Now” – The 
Attractions of Current Compensation after the Tax Reform Act, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1055, 1059-60 
(1971) as well as infra notes xx to xx and related discussion. 
129  Supra note xx and related discussion. 
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Why didn’t tax affect executive pay as much as has been theorized?  
One possibility was that with top marginal tax rates only kicking in at very high 
levels of pay the tax “hit” was not substantial enough to mean senior executives 
were indifferent about their pre-tax pay.  For instance, the highest tax bracket 
was only applicable to income over $200,000 between 1942 and 1947 and over 
$400,000 (for 1955 nearly $3.6 million in today’s money)130 between 1948 and 
1964.
131
  A 1963 study by Leonard Burgess of the executive pay of the three 
highest-paid executives in each of the 25 largest manufacturing companies 
indicates that as of 1958 there executives were paid on average $268,000 
annually.
132
  The top rate of income tax correspondingly apparently was 
irrelevant for many top executives.  Roberts affirmed the point in his 1959 
study, conceding that it was widely thought that tax had impacted upon levels 
of executive pay, but saying “except in periods of emergency the rate has not 
been that high.”133   
Other data Burgess compiled confirms that the after-tax income of top 
executives was far from negligible during the middle decades of the 20
th
 
century.  He estimated using his 1958 data the percentage of the total pay 
package of the three highest paid executives that would have been paid as tax if 
fully progressive rates applied to all forms of executive compensation.  The 
potential tax “take” varied from just over 40% for the executives of 
International Harvester, where the pay of the top three executives taken 
together was $317,000 before taxes and $194,000 after, to just over 60% for the 
executives of Bethlehem Steel, with the equivalent figures for its top three 
executives being nearly $1.6 million and $655,000.
134
  Hence, even though a 
top marginal tax rate of 91% might have reduced the incentive to fight for the 
last dollar, executives could still benefit materially from lucrative aggregate 
pay.   
There were other reasons why tax policy might not have led to marked 
reductions in pre-tax compensation.  A Business Week columnist observed in 
1956 after noting that in the magazine’s most recent annual survey of executive 
pay General Motors president Harlow Curtice had been paid the highest figure 
ever reported by the magazine ($776,000), “A figure like this prompts some 
people to raise the general question:  Why do companies pay their top men so 
much; after all, they keep a relatively small amount of it after taxes.”135  One 
explanation the columnist offered was that pay increases for top executives 
made sense because what they were paid served as a benchmark for other 
executive salaries in the company and too much “compression” at the top 
                                                 
130  Calculated using http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (accessed August 29, 2015).   
131  Tax Policy Center, Historical Individual, supra note xx.   
132  LEONARD RANDOLPH BURGESS, TOP EXECUTIVE PAY PACKAGE 114 (1963). 
133  ROBERTS, supra note xx, 155-56.   
134  Id., 135, 159.   
135  Ideas Shift on Executive Pay, BUS. WK., June 16, 1956, 85.   
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created problems with the setting the pay of less senior executives faced with a 
less onerous tax situation.  Another was that levels of pre-tax pay mattered 
because of “an emotional reaction” -- a typical top executive had “the desire to 
be recognized for his ability or status in terms of pay figures.”136  Graef Crystal, 
writing in 1970 when he was a senior official at a firm specializing in providing 
executive compensation advice, concurred, saying “most executives place 
primary emphasis on their pretax compensation and not their after-tax yield.  
To them, their pretax compensation represents a form of recognition.”137  Given 
this, even if the high income tax rates in place during the mid-20
th
 century were 
prompting executives to leave some money on the table, their pride meant they 
were not about to leave all, or perhaps even most, of it.   
Tax mitigation strategies may have also lessened the effects of high 
marginal tax rates.  For instance, the Business Week columnist, in his 1956 
analysis of why companies continued to pay senior management well despite 
“the big tax bite,” said “many companies (were) changing their ideas of how an 
executive might be paid.”138  The nature of the change was described by a 
practitioner in 1954:  
“It is no longer enough merely to increase the salary or bonus or to 
write a share of the profits into the executive’s contract.  High income tax rates 
leave him very little of any additional compensation. . . . These conditions 
result in a great deal of pressure being exerted on employers to work out new 
methods of compensating executives which will prove attractive tax-wise.”139   
An in-house lawyer at E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. echoed this 
sentiment, observing that “[t]ax planners have devoted much time to devising a 
plan for compensating executives which will alleviate the effect of the high 
individual surtax.”140  Companies indeed increasingly paid their executives 
using tax-favored deferred compensation schemes,
141
 tax advantaged 
“restricted” stock option plans provided for under the Revenue Act of 1950,142 
                                                 
136  Id.  A third factor identified, the market for managerial talent, will be discussed in Part 
V.G. 
137  CRYSTAL, supra note xx, 19. 
138  Ideas Shift, supra note xx. 
139  William C. Childs, Deferred-Compensation Plans for Executives, 1954 INS. L. J. 25. 
140   Roy A. Wentz, Remedying the Effect of Taxation on Management Ownership of 
Corporate Stock, 48 NW. U. L. REV. 442, 443 (1953).   
141  J.K. Lasser and V. Henry Rothschild, Deferred Compensation for Executives, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 1951, 89, 91; Raymond A. Hoffman, Executives’ Compensation, LABOR L. 
J. 97, 101 (Feb. 1952). GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, 2ND, 
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 168, 170 (rev. ed. 1951). [Hereafter “WASHINGTON  
1951”] Louis Eisenstein, A Case of Deferred Compensation, 4 TAX L. REV. 391, 416 (1949). 
142  The 1950 Act reversed an adverse decision of the Supreme Court from 1945 and 
created a class of “restricted stock options” that one contemporary compensation consultant 
claimed “[gave] the stock option a new lease on life as an executive incentive.”  Arch Patton, 
Incentive Compensation for Executives, 29 HARV. BUS. REV. 35, 43 (1951).  On the impact of the 
3/16/20162/2/2016 FOR SUBMISSION 
2016] EXECUTIVE PAY: WHAT WORKED?   23 
 
DRAFT – Please do not quote or cite without authors’ permission 
 
and fringe benefits not subject to tax in the same way as income, such as life 
and health insurance, dining and country club memberships, recreational 
facility fees, interest-free loans, and the free use of personal residences, cars, 
and planes.
143
  
Some observers suggested that deployment of tax planning strategies 
largely cancelled out the effect of high marginal rates.  According to a 1958 law 
review article on executive pay, “The argument that the current high rate of 
individual tax in the upper income brackets provides a built-in safeguard 
against managerial desire for increased compensation has little factual 
basis….[T]axation does not limit total compensation; it merely changes the 
techniques of reward.”144  Tax planning, however, does not explain fully why 
tax failed to constrain executive pay to the extent that might have been 
anticipated.  This is because most of the pay top executives received was in fact 
fully taxable.   
Burgess, in his study of executive pay in the 25 largest companies in 
the U.S. as of 1958, reported on the tax-oriented executive pay “savings” for 
each of the 25 companies, this being the difference between the tax their three 
most highly paid executives would have paid if their compensation was taxed 
fully at the rates applicable to income and actual tax paid, adjusted for 
favorable tax treatment afforded to other types of compensation.  Ford had the 
greatest savings with a differential of 26% between 35% of pre-tax aggregate 
compensation actually paid as tax and a possible tax “hit” of 61%.145  With 
most of the 25 companies, however, the tax savings were 10% or less.  This 
indicates that not only did top executives fail, as the wife of the senior GM 
executive suggested in 1969,
146
 to hand over most of their compensation to the 
government but that tax mitigation strategies played only a supporting role in 
protecting them from a damaging tax “hit.”  None of this is to claim that high 
marginal tax rates had no role in suppressing mid-century executive 
compensation or that it is impossible in theory for tax to put substantial 
                                                                                                                       
change, see Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2099, 2107 (finding that more than 40 percent of 
the companies they studied adopted a restricted stock option plan within five years of the passage 
of the Revenue Act of 1950).  ”Restricted" stock options” were replaced with “qualified stock 
options” in the Revenue Act of 1964, which, among other things, required that to qualify for 
favorable tax treatment the options had to be awarded “at the money”:  Revenue Act of 1964, § 
221, 78 Stat. 63 (1964).  Observers felt, however, that the few additional requirements would 
“not impair its usefulness as a device to avoid income taxes.”  Charles L. B. Lowndes, The 
Revenue Act of 1964:  A Critical Appraisal, 4 DUKE L.J. 667, 684-85 (1964). 
143  William H. Hoffman, Jr., Tax Influences in Shaping the Executive Pay Package, 40 
TAXES 386, 390 (1962); Henry W. Trimble, Jr., Executive Compensation Corporate 
Considerations, 6 PRAC. LAW. 45, 47 (1960); Leslie Mills, Recent Developments in the Taxation 
of Executive Compensation, 34 TAXES 882, 883 (1956)  
144  Robert B. Mautz and Gerald W. Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 
474, 482 (1958).   
145  BURGESS, supra note xx, 160. 
146  Supra note xx and related discussion.   
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downward pressure on executive pay.
147
  Nevertheless, mid-20
th
 century income 
tax rates were not the “smoking gun” explanation for modest executive pay 
claimed by modern proponents of a tax-based solution.
 
 
So we are left with a puzzle. If high tax rates do relatively little, on 
their own, to explain the stagnation of executive pay in the U.S. during the 
middle decades of the 20
th
 century in the U.S., then what does?  We consider 
various possibilities next.   
V. IF NOT TAX, THEN WHAT “WORKED”? 
Having identified the middle decades of the 20
th
 century as an era when 
executive pay was modest in comparison with the decades to follow and set 
aside tax as the key explanatory variable, we consider whether other factors 
“worked” to compress executive pay.  We will begin with variables that can be 
thought of as “internal”, in the sense they were intrinsic features of the public 
companies that were paying the executives.  We then turn to potential 
“external” determinants of managerial remuneration.148   
A. Internal Variables 
1. Boards of Directors 
State corporate statutes vest the board of directors with the authority to 
manage the corporation and it has long been understood that the setting of 
executive pay falls within the ambit of this grant of managerial power.
149
  
Hence, historically boards of public companies have been formally responsible 
for fixing the compensation of the officers.
150
  A correct but ultimately 
uninformative answer can correspondingly be provided to the question why 
executive pay was “compressed” during the middle decades of the 20th century:  
                                                 
147  It is possible, for instance, that this occurred in Britain with respect to cash salaries and 
bonuses.  See, e.g., CHEFFINS, supra note xx, 704.  During the late 1960s, the top marginal rate of 
91% kicked in when gross income reached £19,000 (then approximately $46,000), meaning it 
was virtually impossible for an executive of a U.K. public company to earn much more than 
£10,000 in salary after tax.  See Brian R. Cheffins and Steven A. Bank, Corporate Ownership 
and Control in the U.K.:  The Tax Dimension, 70 MODERN L. REV. 778, 796 (2007).  
148  On internal/external corporate governance dichotomies in related contexts see James P. 
Welsh and James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control 
Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 421, 422-24, 434-35, 445 (1990), Brian R. Cheffins, 
Corporate Governance Since the Managerial Capitalism Era, 89 BUS. HIST. REV. 717, 728-30 
(2015). 
149  Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem:  A Collective Approach to 
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 74 (1992).   
150  FRANKLIN G. MOORE, MANAGEMENT:  ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE 59 (1964); J.M. 
JURAN & J. KEITH LOUDEN, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 65 (1966); Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried 
and David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 765 (2003).   
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boards of directors fixed managerial compensation that way.  That begs the 
more challenging but more interesting question:  Why?  Were boards structured 
in a manner that tilted them towards moderation in a manner that boards have 
not been more recently?  As we will see now, the answer is no, which indicates 
that the manner in which boards were organized does not explain the executive 
pay moderation of the mid-20
th
 century.   
Given that boards of public companies are formally responsible for 
setting managerial compensation, critics of executive pay have not surprisingly 
identified the board as a prime culprit when diagnosing what has gone “wrong.”  
Those espousing what has been referred to as the “managerial power” approach 
to executive pay assert that executive pay reached unjustified levels in recent 
decades largely because powerful executives benefitted from favors weak 
boards bestowed.
151
  Critics who blame the board acknowledge that even before 
Dodd Frank required U.S. public companies to set up a compensation 
committee comprised of “independent” directors most public companies had 
such committees in place.
152
  The critics have argued, however, that due to 
CEOs exercising significant influence over the director nomination process and 
to board dynamics that mean independent directors are supportive of the 
management team absent a crisis (“support or fire”) compensation committees 
are counter-productively management friendly.
153
   
Following the logic of those who blame boards for executive pay 
reaching unsatisfactory levels in recent decades, it would seem that boardroom 
procedures must have been more robust during the middle decades of the 20
th
 
century than they were in ensuing decades.  As various critics of managerial 
power theory have argued, the situation in fact was quite different.
154
  Boards, 
even if they did not function optimally as the 20
th
 century drew to a close, 
nevertheless were structured to operate more effectively as detached scrutineers 
of managerial behavior than had been the case previously.  Of particular 
relevance in the present context, independent directors, who might have been 
expected to enhance the objectivity of the process by which executive pay was 
set, moved to the forefront just as managerial compensation began to escalate 
                                                 
151  Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, Managerial, supra note xx, 754; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra 
note xx, at 2.  See also Randall Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap:  Board 
Capture or Market Driven, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2004) (summarizing “board capture 
theory”); cf. DORFF, supra note xx, 116 (“the existing evidence is a far cry from persuasive proof 
that managerial power is the primary cause of the inefficiencies Bebchuk and Fried catalog so 
aptly”).   
152  Supra note xx and related discussion; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, Managerial, supra 
note xx, 765. 
153  Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, Managerial, supra note xx, 766-67; Charles M. Elson, 
Executive Overcompensation -- A Board-Based Solution, 34 BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 937, 974-80 
(1993). 
154  See, e.g., Thomas, Explaining, supra note xx, 1175; Kaplan, CEO, supra note xx, 15; 
Marianne Bertrand, CEOs, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 121, 134 (2009).  
 3/16/20162/2/2016 FOR SUBMISSION 
26 LAW REVIEW               [Vol. __:__ 
 
DRAFT – Please do not quote or cite without authors’ permission 
rapidly.  Hence, “if managerial power is the principal explanatory variable for 
escalating pay, the timing is odd.”155   
A 2007 study by Jeffrey Gordon of the growing prominence of 
independent directors over time is instructive on trends concerning board 
structure.  He says that as of 1950 the consensus was “that boards should 
consist of the firm’s senior officers, some outsiders with deep connections with 
the firm…and a few directors who were nominally independent but handpicked 
by the CEO.”156  Hence, according to Gordon, only 15% of directors in large 
public companies were executives of the same firm as 2005,
157
 compared with 
approximately half in industrial companies both in the mid-1930s and at the 
start of the 1950s.
158
   
The proportion of directors who were executives of the same company 
was considerably smaller with railways and utility companies at mid-century 
than was the case in industrial companies.
159
  Even, however, with companies 
where executives were outnumbered on the board, boards seemingly were not 
well-positioned to engage in arm’s-length negotiations over executive pay.  A 
1945 study of business leadership in large corporations indicated that boards of 
the time were “passive” and said that outside directors “function[ed], if at all, 
primarily as financial and business advisers.”160  According to a 1958 law 
review article on executive pay, boards were “frequently either inactive and 
mere formalities or they [were] officer dominated.”161  A 1964 text on 
management organization suggested similarly that “most boards don’t review 
the executives’ stewardship very critically.  Outside directors are only part-time 
men and are sometimes beholden to the president (chief executive officer) and 
hold their jobs at his sufferance.”162   
                                                 
155  Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation:  If There’s a Problem What is the 
Remedy?  The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis”, 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 683 
(2005).     
156  Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:  
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007).   
157  Id., 1565. 
158  Kenneth M. Lehn, Sukesh Patro and Mengxin Zhao, Determinants of the Size and 
Composition of US Boards:  1935-2000, 38 FIN. MGMT. 747, 758 (2009), cited by Gordon, Rise, 
supra note xx, 156.  On the mid-1930s, see also ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN 
THE LARGE CORPORATION 122 (1945) (with 25 selected large industrial corporations 191 of the 
372 directors were officers).   
159  GORDON, BUSINESS, supra note xx, 123 (with 10 large utilities and railways as of 1935 
officers held 35 of 154 directorships); MABEL NEWCOMER, THE BIG BUSINESS EXECUTIVE:  THE 
FACTORS THAT MADE HIM 1900-1950 27 (1955) (indicating that as of 1952 executives were in the 
minority on the boards of all railway companies and nearly 90% of utilities).   
160  GORDON, BUSINESS, supra note xx, 144, 145.   
161  Mautz and Rock, supra note xx, 490.    
162  MOORE, MANAGEMENT, supra note xx, 61.   
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There was awareness during the mid-20
th
 century that the manner in 
which boards were structured and functioned was problematic from an 
executive pay perspective.  The 1958 law review article on executive pay that 
characterized boards as inactive or officer dominated spelt out the implications:  
“Who controls the wages of management?  It is accurate to say that it is usually 
management.  There is the possibility of danger in such a situation….”163  An 
executive compensation expert noted similarly in a 1943 Harvard Business 
Review article “In most companies executives have control over their own 
compensation; herein lie both temptation and opportunity to profit personally 
from compensation policies.”164  The authors of a 1975 study that found little 
relation between executive pay and standard measures of corporate 
performance thought it was relevant that “Friendly boards, usually chosen by 
the chief executives…make the compensation process a congenial give-and-
take affair.”165 
During the decades immediately following World War II, delegation to 
board committees was emerging as a response to the potential conflict of 
interest that existed in the executive pay realm due to managerial influence in 
the boardroom.  A 1955 empirical investigation of “big business” executives 
indicated that when boards established committees to deal with managerial 
salaries it was customary for the committee to be staffed exclusively by outside 
directors.
166
  By 1967, nearly three out of five larger public companies had 
established a compensation committee.
167
  Due to the fact that it was “indelicate 
and improper for inside officer-directors to sit in judgment on their own salaries 
and incentive compensation” such committees “increasingly [were]…made up 
exclusively of outside directors who may make final decisions in this important 
area.”168  Doubts existed, however, about the objectivity of these committees, in 
part because the recipients of the compensation usually had considerable 
influence over the composition of the committees.
169
  Also, the compensation 
committees typically did not get “to upset established patterns.  Big 
changes…[were] full board actions.”170 
                                                 
163  Mautz and Rock, supra note xx, 500.   
164  John C. Baker, A “Just Gauge” for Executive Compensation, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Autumn 1943, 75, 76.  Baker was author of a 1938 book on executive pay:  BAKER,  supra note 
xx.  
165  K.R. Srinivasa Murthy and Malcolm S. Salter, Should CEO Pay be Linked to Results?, 
HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1975, 66, 71.   
166  NEWCOMER, supra note xx, 127.   
167  Marshall Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 
HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1358 (1979) (citing data compiled by the Conference Board).   
168  HAROLD KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 179, 180 
(1967).   
169  NEWCOMER, supra note xx, 127; Erwin N. Griswold, Are Stock Options Getting Out of 
Hand?, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1960, 47, 55. 
170  MOORE, MANAGEMENT, supra note xx, 592. 
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With most large public companies having a compensation committee 
staffed by independent directors by 2000,
171
 the procedure public companies 
were using to set executive pay therefore apparently was more objective and 
robust as the 20
th
 century drew to a close than it was during the middle decades 
of the 20
th
 century.  Executive pay thus seemingly grew dramatically in tandem 
with better corporate governance.  Correspondingly, the manner in which 
boards were structured does not explain the executive pay arrangements in 
place during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century.   
2. Shareholders 
Policymakers have recently shown considerable faith in shareholders as 
a check on runaway executive pay, as evidenced by the introduction of “say-on-
pay” votes in Dodd-Frank.172  It is open to question whether shareholders are 
ever likely to use powers available to them to reform executive pay in the way 
critics who argue that executives are paid “too much” hope or expect.173  
Regardless, shareholders were pretty much entirely peripheral to the 
moderation in executive compensation occurring between the 1940s and the 
1970s.  While shareholders had (and have) a variety of tools at their disposal 
that could be used to influence compensation decisions, shareholder challenges 
to executive pay were uncommon and usually unsuccessful. 
Though a “say-on-pay” vote was decades in the future, shareholders 
acting collectively theoretically could have substantially influenced the setting 
of executive pay during the middle of the 20
th
 century.  The powers available to 
them, however, turned out to be of little practical importance.  One way that 
shareholders potentially could have dictated the approach companies took to 
executive pay was by selecting directors who would implement desired policies 
when exercising control over the setting of managerial compensation.  During 
the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, however, boards themselves controlled 
the director nomination process and usually put forward a slate listing as many 
individuals as there were open seats on the board, whom shareholders would 
then duly elect.
174
  The only time shareholders were given a real choice with 
director selection was during a proxy fight, which frequently involved an 
attempted takeover of the corporation.  Proxy contests for board control in 
public companies were not particularly common, however, with the number 
                                                 
171  Supra note xx and related discussion.   
172  Supra note xx and related discussion.   
173  See Bank & Georgiev, supra note xx, at 3.   
174  J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 43, 46 (1958). 
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attracting press coverage averaging just over 13 per year between 1945 and 
1965.
175
   
Board elections aside, shareholders were given in some instances a veto 
over particular aspects of executive pay.  Though it was thought to be good 
practice for companies to seek shareholder approval when they introduced new 
executive compensation bonus and stock option plans, particularly if there was 
a shadow of self-dealing, this was never required in any general way.
176
  On the 
other hand, some states, including New York, mandated shareholder approval 
in circumstances where a corporation was establishing a plan involving the 
issuance of stock to employees, including executive stock option plans.
177
  
Shareholder approval would also typically become necessary under state 
corporate law if implementing a stock option plan required a corporation to 
increase its share capital or if existing shareholders were vested with pre-
emptive rights.
178
  The New York Stock Exchange additionally required all 
listed companies to seek shareholder approval of issuances of stock options to 
senior executives.
179
  Despite all this, it was virtually unknown for shareholders 
to use their powers to block proposed changes to managerial compensation.
180
   
It is not surprising that shareholders, acting together, failed to curb 
executive pay during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century.  The retail 
investors who collectively owned most of the shares in public companies 
during this era lacked both the appetite and aptitude to intervene in corporate 
affairs.
181
  The fact institutional investors, which held at this time only a small 
                                                 
175  Derived from data generated for John Armour and Brian Cheffins, Stock Market Prices 
and the Market for Corporate Control, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2016), working paper 
version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646778, 29 (Figure 3).  
176  See 1 GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD 2D, COMPENSATING THE 
CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 27 (1962) (hereafter “WASHINGTON 1962”) (“[M]anagement will, as a 
matter of good practice today, and even though not required by law or regulation, submit a plan 
for its own compensation to stockholders for their approval”), 228 (“Not only may submission to 
stockholders help clear up questions of the directors’ power; it may also be helpful in resolving 
doubts as to the manner of the exercise of that power”).  
177  Id. at 251-54 & n. 223 (citing NY Stock Corp. Law § 14 (1951). The Model Business 
Corporation Act had an optional provision requiring shareholder approval. Id.  
178  Anthony M. Vernava, Stock Options:  Corporate, Regulatory and Related Tax Aspects, 
30 U. PITT. L. REV. 197, 229-30 (1968). 
179  2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at  824.  
180  See 1 WASHINGTON 1962,  supra note __, at  223-28, 252-54 (in a multi-page discussion 
of shareholder voting on compensation plans in the standard work on executive compensation, no 
case was discussed where shareholders voted to reject a stock option plan); Note, Shareholder 
Attack Against Stock Options For Corporate Executives, 62 YALE L.J. 84, 90 (1952) (saying in 
the context of potential shareholder opposition to stock options “ratification is often an empty 
formality”).  For an instance where shareholders did defeat a management-sponsored stock option 
plan see Robert Metz, Criticism Voiced on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1963, 147 
(discussing General Baking Co.).  
181  Brian R. Cheffins, Introduction, THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ix, xix (Brian R. Cheffins, ed., 2011). 
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percentage of corporate equities despite an emerging trend in favor of 
institutional ownership,
182
 would not actively oppose proposals management 
put forward at shareholder meetings helped to give companies full freedom in 
setting executive compensation.
183
  The upshot, as the AFL-CIO said in a 1959 
report critical of stock options, was that “management is in the driver’s seat.  
With its control over proxies it is able to do pretty much as it pleases.”184   
Given that it was unlikely that shareholders would exercise power 
collectively to influence executive pay, shareholder influence was restricted to 
individual investors prepared either to agitate publicly for change or to litigate 
to challenge particular features of managerial compensation.  During the middle 
decades of the 20
th
 century, shareholder agitation was the province of the 
“gadflies,” self-appointed spokespersons for stockholders who lobbied for 
shareholder rights, with the most visible being Lewis and John Gilbert and 
Wilma Soss.
185
 Executive compensation was one of the gadflies’ perennial 
targets.  Lewis Gilbert, for example, used shareholder proposals, speeches and 
media interviews to denounce executive salaries (he thought many too high) 
and to call for reform of stock option plans (he wanted longer holding periods 
for exercised options) and pension schemes (he wanted annual pensions capped 
at $25,000).
186
  
The media found something appealing in the gadflies’ quest to force 
managers to listen to shareholders,
187
 which meant that the gadflies could 
garner some beneficial publicity.  However, because few shareholders were 
prepared to offer active support the gadflies did not wield real power.
188
  This 
was as much the case with executive pay as with other issues.  Graef Crystal, 
writing in 1970, said that while “some companies rationalize their failure to pay 
meaningful incentive awards by citing the specter of adverse stockholder 
                                                 
182  In 1950 mutual funds and private and public retirement funds held 4% of corporate 
equities; in 1970, less than 15%.  See JAMES P. HAWLEY AND ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF 
FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 53 (2000). 
183  J.A. Livingston, Investors Could Curb Executive Excesses, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1958, 
C24.    
184  Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO Research Section, The Stock Option Scandal, 
unpublished, Aug. 1959.    
185  See Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1079-81 
(2016); see also W. Covington Hardee, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1100 (1954). 
186  See LIVINGSTON, supra note __, at 88-89; see also LEWIS D. AND JOHN J. GILBERT, 
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATE MEETINGS DURING 
1958 122 (1959).  
187  See, e.g., Andy Logan, Hoboken Must Go!, NEW YORKER, Mar. 17, 1951, at 34; John 
Bainbridge, The Talking Stockholder—I, NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 1948, at 40.   
188  See, though, John E. Balkcom, Executive Compensation:  A History of Imbalance in 
Public Controls, Shareholder Interests and Executive Rewards, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 
1977, 4, 7 (suggesting that a 1938 Gilbert proposal that the highly paid CEO of Bethlehem Steel 
be demoted to a less lucrative post that was roundly rejected may nevertheless have prompted the 
company to pay that CEO less).    
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reaction,” most shareholders “were unlikely to begrudge a company $5 million 
in bonus funds, if the funds are paid only when they receive $25 million in 
additional earnings.”189  Given such attitudes, the gadflies’ shareholder 
proposals relating to executive pay not only never passed, but were usually 
overwhelmingly rejected in shareholder votes.
190
   
On the litigation front, lawsuits have been launched with some 
regularity over time by shareholders who believe executives have been 
overpaid.
191
  The trend was the same during the middle decades of the 20
th
 
century, but it is unlikely that litigation was any more effective as a check on 
executive pay than was agitation.  In the early 1930s, in Rogers v Hill,
192
 a 
shareholder successfully challenged “excessive” compensation paid through a 
bonus plan at American Tobacco, briefly igniting hope that courts would 
seriously scrutinize executive pay packages and strike down those that were 
“excessive.”  Over the rest of the decade, though, such hopes dwindled as 
courts admitted themselves incompetent to judge what was a “fair” amount of 
compensation and consistently rejected shareholder suits challenging big pay 
packages as a “waste” of corporate assets.193  After 1945, shareholder suits 
solely challenging the amount of compensation public companies paid to 
executives were, absent evidence of procedural irregularities or self-dealing, 
almost always thrown out of court.
194
 
A fresh avenue for shareholder suits opened up with the growing 
popularity of stock options.
195
  Following changes in 1950 to tax law that were 
favorable to stock options,
196
 a wave of lawsuits challenged the stock option 
schemes companies had begun adopting, with many resting on claims that 
executives gave inadequate consideration in exchange for the options.
197
  
Litigants had some success in the early 1950s in Delaware’s normally pro-
                                                 
189  CRYSTAL, supra note xx, 32. 
190  Metz, Criticism, supra note xx (saying in an article on executive pay that Lewis 
Gilbert’s “resolutions are usually roundly defeated”); Bosses’ Pay: Executive Salary Lags in 
Economic Race, but ‘Fringes’ Ease Pain, WALL ST. J. Feb. 24 1955, 1 (“[T]he failure of most 
Gilbert pay-curbing efforts suggest their views are not widely shared by stockholders”).  An 
exception was in 1969 when 19% of shareholder votes were cast in favor of a Gilbert proposal 
that would put a $350,000 ceiling on the pay of any GM executive:  About 19%, supra note xx.   
191  See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: 
Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers' Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 865-
880 (2011). 
192  289 U.S. 582 (1933) 
193  See Wells, No Man can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year, supra note __, at 711-16, 732-37. 
194  See Thomas & Wells, supra note __, at 868-873. Some challenges were successful 
when it was argued a bonus had been swelled by improper accounting that overstated earnings, 
but adoption of standardized accounting measures ended this line of attack:  2 WASHINGTON 
1962, supra note __, at  920.  
195  See Vagts, supra note xx, 262-64. 
196  See sources cited supra note xx.    
197  2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 573-74 & n.21 (setting out the major companies 
involved in litigation over their options plans). 
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business courts.
 198
  However, subsequent shareholder lawsuits targeting stock 
option grants almost always failed.
 199
  The consideration question was easily 
solved by advance planning,
200
 and courts turned out to be no more willing to 
police stock option grants on the basis of unreasonableness than they were 
willing to second-guess other compensation decisions.
201
  Delaware also 
amended its corporate legislation in 1953 to make a board’s determination as to 
consideration offered for stock options conclusive “absent fraud.”202   Litigation 
over other forms of compensation was fairly rare during the rest of the 1950s.
 
203
  There was an uptick in shareholder litigation involving executive pay in 
public companies as the 1960s began, but most such lawsuits again failed.
204
   
As we will see in section B, norms relevant to public companies likely 
had a meaningful role in compressing executive pay during the middle decades 
of the 20
th
 century.  It is possible that, despite a lack of tangible evidence that 
shareholders had a marked impact on executive pay, concern about shareholder 
agitation helped to reinforce these norms and thereby dissuaded firms from 
adopting outsize compensation schemes.  For instance, Washington and 
Rothschild, in the 1951 edition of a manual on executive pay, acknowledged 
shareholder lawsuits and the attendant publicity could have some effect: 
“Litigation or the possibility of litigation…have probably brought down 
compensation levels, or at least kept compensation levels lower than they might 
otherwise have been.”205  Overall, though, it would appear that shareholder 
intervention did relatively little to slow the growth of executive compensation 
during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century.    
B. External Variables 
                                                 
198  Gottlieb v Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952); Kerbs v. California 
Eastern Airlines Inc., 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952) 
199  See Vagts, supra note __, at 263 (“These cases had no particular impact on the 
generosity with which boards of directors awarded their employees”). 
200  On how this could be done see Note, Shareholder Attack Against Stock Options for 
Corporate Executives, 64 YALE L.J. 87-88 (1952). 
201  2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 572-74, 906-09. 
202  Id. at 578-79. 
203  See id. at 915. There was at least one high profile compensation suit in the late 1950s, 
Nadler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 154 A2d 146 (Del.Ch. 1959) (dealing with a special bonus plan 
linked to corporate dividends); discussed in Bethlehem Steel Stock Option, Change in Pay for 
Executives Voted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1957, at 32. 
204  See Companies in Court: Stockholders File More Suits, Sparking Debate Among 
Lawyers, WALL ST. J. April 27, 1961, at 1.  Cf. Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative 
Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77-78 (1967) (indicating that with a random sample of recent 
derivative suits there were “many instances” where excessive salaries were challenged but it is 
likely most of these lawsuits involved closely held companies). 
205  2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 921-22. They also cautioned that “so many 
forces are at work—such as varying corporate profits or varying stock market prices—that it is 
unsafe to generalize.” Id. 
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We have just seen that during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century the 
manner in which boards were structured prompted concerns that the setting of 
executive pay was “a congenial give-and-take affair”206 and that shareholders 
were at best bit players with managerial compensation.  Nevertheless, the data 
set out in part II shows there was no wanton executive pay free-for-all.  This 
was known at the time.  As economist John Kenneth Galbraith acknowledged 
in 1971, “Management does not go out ruthlessly to reward itself – a sound 
management is expected to exercise restraint.”207  Correspondingly, he said 
“There are few corporations in which it would be suggested that executive 
salaries are at a maximum.”208   
Why did management not ruthlessly reward itself during the mid-20
th
 
century?  Our analysis in Part IV indicated that tax played at best a subsidiary 
role.  We will consider now various additional “external” variables that may 
have operated as constraints and correspondingly explain executive pay during 
this era.  We will begin with direct regulation of pay and then consider 
disclosure regulation, union power, the market for managerial talent and 
corporate “culture” in the form of “norms.”  We will see that while each played 
a role the final three do the most to account for executive pay being modest by 
present day standards during the mid-20
th
 century.   
1. Direct Regulation 
Statutory measures that give government officials scope to stipulate 
how much companies can pay executives –“direct regulation”– theoretically 
can address the configuration of managerial compensation in a more forthright 
manner than any other variable.
209
  On the other hand, this sort of intervention 
has been characterized as “the last available cure for excessive paychecks” 
because “the government [c]ould be quickly drawn into an intricate process 
generating intense political pressure and threatening to produce arbitrary, rigid 
results.”210  In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt relied on a broadly phrased 
wartime mandate for price stabilization to impose an upper limit of $25,000 
annually on executives’ after-tax salaries, but Congress quickly overrode the 
measure.
211
  Otherwise, to the extent that direct regulation has shaped executive 
pay in the U.S., this has occurred through regulatory schemes affecting the 
economy generally.
212
  Laws of this sort would have had an impact on 
                                                 
206  Supra note xx and related discussion.   
207  JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 115 (2d ed., 1971). 
208  Id., 115-16.  
209  Cheffins & Thomas, Globalization, supra note xx, 262.    
210  BOK, supra note xx, 116, 117.  
211  Mark Leff, The Politics of Sacrifice on the American Home Front in World War II, 77 
J. AM. HIST. 1296, 1299 (1991); WASHINGTON 1951, supra note __, at 299-300 (indicating the cap 
was repealed so quickly that it had no practical effect). 
212  There have also been instances where executive pay has been regulated directly in a 
particular industry.  For instance, during the middle decades of the 20th century state utility 
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managerial compensation at particular points in time.  Direct regulation, 
however, does relatively little to explain why executive pay was suppressed in 
general terms from the 1940s to the 1970s. 
Economy-wide regulation impacting on executive pay was initially 
implemented during World War II as part of sweeping controls aimed at 
holding down wartime inflation.  There was a salary freeze applicable to all 
companies from 1942 until late 1946 overseen by a complex bureaucracy 
evaluating requests for salary adjustments.
213
  The regulations froze not only 
salaries but also bonuses and, in some cases, stock option plans, but they did 
not cover deferred compensation, pension plans, and health and life insurance, 
each apparently exempted as unlikely immediately to fuel inflation.
214
  
Frydman and Malloy, in a careful econometric study, reported that the controls 
may have held down executive compensation during the years they were in 
place while affording average workers’ wages some scope to grow.215  Frydman 
and Malloy also found, however, that the effects of the salary controls were 
short-lived, meaning they did not explain a decline in executive pay that 
occurred during the remainder of the 1940s.
216
   
During the Korean War, limits were again placed on executive salaries 
as part of a regulatory regime targeting wartime inflation.  This time a separate 
Salary Stabilization Board was established in recognition of the “peculiar 
nature of many forms of compensation paid to the executive, administrative, 
and professional employees.”217 This episode of direct regulation had little 
impact on levels of executive pay because the Board did not get to work until 
late 1951 and was within a year largely moribund because the inflationary 
conditions that had been expected did not materialize.
218
   
The final period in which the Federal government significantly 
regulated executive pay on an economy-wide level was during the early 1970s.  
From 1971 to 1974 wage and price controls were imposed to attempt to contain 
inflation.
219
  Under this regime, following an initial 90-day freeze on 
                                                                                                                       
regulators sought to impose limits on executive pay by refusing to grant rate increases when 
companies had made managerial compensation payments thought to be “excessive” or by 
“excluding excessive salaries from the rate base”:  2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 791. 
213  WASHINGTON 1951, supra note __, at 300-05. 
214  Id. at 305-07.  
215  Frydman and Malloy, supra note __, at 232 (table showing decline in average and 
median executive pay from 1942 to 1946, and decrease in ratio of executive to average worker 
pay). 
216  See id. at 225-30. 
217  Rudolf Sobernheim, Salary Stabilization under Defense Mobilization, __ FED. BAR J. 
117, 134 (1951).  
218  See Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where we are, supra note __, at 54-55.   
219  The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Murphy, Executive Compensation: 
Where we are, supra note __, at __-__; see also ALLAN MATUSOW, NIXON’S ECONOMY: BOOMS, 
BUSTS, DOLLARS, AND VOTES 62-67, 109-116, 228-234 (1998). 
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compensation increases, the Federal government’s Wage Board limited 
increases in executive pay to 5.5% annually.  It is doubtful whether the controls 
had a marked impact on top management pay, given that  1972 and 1973 
surveys of executive compensation by Business Week indicated CEO pay, on 
average, increased by more than the 5.5% limit.
220
  One reason may be that the 
restrictions were initially imposed on a corporation’s executives as a group, 
thereby leaving scope for companies to increase CEO pay while curtailing that 
of lower-ranking executives.
221
  Also, the wage and price control scheme may 
have done more to alter the composition of pay than reduce pay overall.  The 
adoption of new incentive plans was permitted so long as they were “directly 
related to increased productivity” and, not surprisingly, “scores of companies 
introduced performance-based bonus plans linked to accounting data or 
revenues.”222   
2. Disclosure Regulation 
Mandatory disclosure of executive pay constitutes a less intrusive form 
of government intervention than direct regulation because whatever impact the 
law might have does not arise from the fact of disclosure itself.  Instead, the 
catalyst is the reactions disclosure elicits—the shareholders it angers, the 
politicians it pushes to impose new laws and the journalists who disseminate 
the data to a receptive public.  Disclosure thus might facilitate the curbing of 
managerial compensation, but it is not sufficient to achieve this objective.   
Mandatory disclosure of executive pay at public companies has been in 
place in the U.S. since federal securities law was introduced in the mid-1930s.  
Though investor protection is typically cited as the rationale underlying the 
enactment of federal securities law, the primary motive underlying the 
introduction of executive pay disclosure requirements in the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to respond to inflammatory 
revelations concerning managerial compensation and more broadly to “shame” 
executives discredited by the Depression into limiting their compensation.
223
  
The 1934 Act was the more consequential, requiring corporations traded on 
national stock exchanges to reveal annually, in registration documents to be 
filed with the SEC and made available to the public, remuneration paid to 
directors and officers, including “bonus and profit-sharing arrangements.”224  
Form 10-K, issued to implement this requirement, required corporations to 
                                                 
220  Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note __, at 260. 
221  Id.; this loophole was tightened in 1973. 
222  Id. 
223   See sources cited supra note xx.   
224  Exchange Act 12(b). 
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report the compensation received by the three highest-paid “officers, directors, 
[or] employees” of the firm.225   
Disclosure regulation would become more demanding over time.  We 
have already seen that major reforms were carried out in 1992,
226
 but this was 
preceded by various other changes that made the disclosure requirements more 
rigorous.  For instance, mindful that it was advisable (though not mandatory) 
for companies to seek shareholder approval for executive bonus schemes and 
stock option plans,
227
 the SEC required in 1938 that proxy statements 
corporations sent to shareholders disclose full details of any compensation plan 
for which shareholder approval was sought.
228
  Four years later, the SEC further 
amended the proxy rules to require that compensation arrangements that were 
reported in proxy solicitation documentation sent to shareholders be set out in a 
tabular form for each director and each officer paid more than $20,000 a 
year.
229
   
In 1952 the SEC amended the proxy reporting rules to oblige 
companies to divulge, again in tabular form, compensation for each director as 
well the “top 3” executives receiving more than $25,000 annually and to 
respond to a widening of the range of the types of compensation companies 
were awarding by stipulating that executive pay taking the form of deferred 
remuneration, including pension and retirement plans, had to be divulged 
separately.
230
  Also, shareholders who were asked to approve a bonus, profit 
sharing, or stock option plan had to be furnished with data about both the plan 
and the benefits to be awarded to each director or “top 3” officer.231  In 1978 
companies were required to factor in payoffs from long-term incentive schemes 
in a way that had not occurred previously because disclosures formerly made in 
nearly incomprehensible tables at the back of corporate proxy statements had to 
be dealt with in a clearer fashion near the front of the disclosure 
documentation.
232
   
                                                 
225  See BAKER, supra note xx, at 258 (reprinting original Form 10-K). 
226  Supra note xx and accompanying text.   
227  Supra note xx and related discussion. 
228  Securities Exchange Act Rel. 34-1823 (Aug 11, 1938). 
229  Securities Exchange Act Rel. 34-3375 (December 18, 1942). 
230  Id. 
231  Amendment of Proxy Rules, Securities Exchange Act Rel. 34-4775 (December 11, 
1952).  
232  Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV. BUS. REV., 
March/Apr. 1986, 125, 129, 131.  Information on options was included in the proxy statements 
but consisted primarily of details from which the reader had to carry out a computational process 
to determine what an executive had earned:  BURGESS, supra note xx, 198.  In 1983 the SEC 
moved to a more narrative (and less informative) approach to executive compensation disclosure, 
but returned to the requirements for formatted tables and more detail in 1992:  Securities Act Rel. 
No. 33-8865, supra note xx, notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.  
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There are no empirical studies that have isolated the impact of 
disclosure on the level of executive pay.
233
  Even documenting its effects 
anecdotally is difficult.
234
  One potential stumbling block is that, as Lucian 
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have observed, companies can seek to avoid public 
criticism of executive pay through a process of “camouflage” where much of 
the compensation awarded to executives is channelled into forms where 
disclosure can be obscured or avoided altogether.
235
  The camouflage pattern 
was evident almost as soon as disclosure of executive pay was required.  In the 
late 1930s, firms that awarded executive compensation in the form of deferred 
compensation plans, pensions, stock bonuses, and stock options would often 
refrain from taking such compensation into account in tabular data and justify 
only providing background information in a footnote on the basis that such 
compensation could not be reliably valued.
236
  Boards also began to “look for 
supplemental methods of compensating their corporate executives” that would 
not be subject to compulsory disclosure.
237
   
A 1986 article by executive pay expert Kevin Murphy indicates how 
gaps in disclosure requirements can make it difficult to ascertain accurately the 
impact of disclosure on executive pay.
238
  Murphy relied on executive pay data 
compiled by Forbes to illustrate key compensation trends and reported 
substantial increases in CEO compensation totals in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  The executive pay regime in place in public companies from 1940 
through to the 1970s likely was ending during this period.
239
  Murphy, however, 
said the  trend he found could be explained in large measure on the basis that 
the 1978 changes to SEC rules meant that stock options and other forms of 
long-term incentive-oriented compensation were being factored in in a way that 
had not been the case previously.
240
   
Another problem that complicates assessment of the impact of 
mandatory disclosure on executive pay levels that is particularly relevant for 
present purposes is that disclosure’s effects may vary over time.  As we have 
already seen, it is widely thought that the bolstering of disclosure requirements 
by the SEC in 1992 amid concerns over rising levels of executive pay had the 
unintended consequence of fostering higher executive pay.
241
  Executive pay 
expert Graef Crystal, who was a consultant to the SEC chairman at the time 
                                                 
233  Suárez, Symbolic, supra note xx, 90. 
234  Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 145; George T. Washington, The 
Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, HARV. L. REV. 735, 766 (1941). 
235  BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note __, at 67-70. 
236  GEORGE T. WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES’ COMPENSATION 233-234 & n.35 
(1942).  
237  1 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 9.  
238  Murphy, Top, supra note xx. 
239  Supra note xx and related discussion.  
240  Murphy, Top, supra note xx, 129, 131.   
241   Supra note xx and related discussion. 
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reform occurred, observed ruefully in the mid-2000s “I absolutely thought it 
would cause comp to go down because the disclosures would be so 
embarrassing.  But it turned out when somebody is hauling in $200 million, 
he’s not embarrassable.”242  Crystal’s assumption, though erroneous, was 
understandable.  This is because disclosure’s impact on executive pay levels 
may well have been different in the early 1990s than it would have in earlier 
decades.  In particular, while disclosure reform may have caused executive pay 
to increase in the early 1990s, during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century 
disclosure may have put downward pressure on executive pay because 
corporate boards, mindful of possible negative publicity, refrained from 
awarding executives compensation likely to attract attention and criticism.  
There is anecdotal evidence indicating that disclosure did serve as a 
moderating influence on executive pay during the middle decades of the 20
th
 
century.  George Thomas Washington, a law professor who co-authored a 
leading executive pay manual, said in 1941 of the mandatory disclosure regime 
introduced in the mid-1930s “the publicity given to compensation in recent 
years had largely removed the unhealthy atmosphere of the boom days.”243  
After World War II, he indicated in his executive pay manual that the 
disclosure requirements administered by the SEC “expose[] management’s 
proposals to public view and criticism and, like other disclosure requirements. . 
. serve[] as a restraint.”244  Jensen and Murphy, in their 1990 Harvard Business 
Review article advocating supercharging executive pay with performance-
oriented compensation, explained why companies had been paying executives 
like “bureaucrats” partly on the basis that compensation committees mindful of 
executive pay disclosure had been seeking to forestall criticism of “what the 
boss makes” by capping what their CEOs earned.245  
Particularly telling is the complete absence of pay packages exceeding 
$1 million a year—the kind of pay packages that triggered outcries in the 
1930s—from the 1940s to the late 1970s.246  For many years “the one million 
dollar line . . .  seemed. . . to serve as a psychological barrier to advances.”247  
For instance, Business Week observed in its 1974 survey of executive salaries 
“More executives edged closer to the magic $1 million mark in 1973,” 
including Paul Hofmann of Johnson & Johnson, who earned $978,000.
248
  Still, 
while inflation averaged over 8% annually between 1974 and 1976,
249
 no 
                                                 
242  Quoted in Nocera, Disclosure, supra note xx. 
243  2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, 766.   
244  1 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 27.   
245  Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 144-45.   
246  On $1 million per year executives, see supra note xx and related discussion.  
247  Vagts, supra note xx, 232. 
248  Executive Compensation:  Getting, supra note xx.   
249  Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2015, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ (accessed Aug. 28, 
2015) (11.0% in 1974, 9.1% in 1975 and 5.8% in 1976).   
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executive joined the $1 million club until 1977,
250
 likely because of concerns 
about negative publicity fostered by disclosures made to the SEC. 
While disclosure regulation may have put downward pressure on 
executive pay during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, why would the 
impact of disclosure vary over time?
251
  The most likely answer is that 
mentioned above:  disclosure does not work by itself.  Its impact instead 
depends on who is using the information divulged and how.  Jensen and 
Murphy said of the effect that disclosure had on managerial labor contracts in 
their 1990 article “[t]hird parties play an important role in the contracting 
process, and strong political forces operate inside and outside companies to 
shape executive pay.”252  As we will see in the following sub-sections, during 
the middle decades of the 20
th
 century unions were influential and social norms 
militated against extremely high pay.  In this environment, disclosure likely put 
downward pressure on managerial compensation because union officials could 
find out readily what top executives were paid and because those setting 
managerial compensation knew that the results of their decisions would be in 
the public domain.  When union power faded and social norms evolved, 
disclosure’s effects changed, and changed in a way that meant regulation could 
prompt increases in executive pay.  We consider next in more detail the impact 
of unions on managerial compensation.    
3. Unions 
There has been speculation in the academic literature that downward 
pressure unions put on executive pay helps to explain the flatness of executive 
pay during the mid-20
th
 century.
253
  Given the weakness of unions in the private 
sector presently -- union membership in the United States among non-
agricultural workers in the private sector is approximately 12%
254
 -- this 
conjecture seems scarcely plausible.  During the middle decades of the 20
th
 
century, however, matters were much different.   
                                                 
250  Supra note xx and related discussion. 
251  See, however, Suárez, Symbolic, supra note xx, 90 (arguing that disclosure regulation 
has always drove pay upwards, saying in so doing executive pay rose from the early 1950 to the 
1970s, when the increases began to accelerate rapidly).  While it is true that executive pay did 
increase in nominal terms from the 1950s through the 1970s, the fact that it was outpaced by 
inflation and wage increases awarded to rank-and-file employees (supra notes xx to xx and 
related discussion) meant there was restraint of a sort that disappeared completely by the 1980s.  
The evidence presented here indicates that disclosure regulation contributed to that outcome.    
252  Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 144. 
253  Suárez, Symbolic, supra note xx, 97 (“a promising area of research”); Xavier Gabaix 
and Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 75-76 (2008); 
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes:  A Historical and 
International Perspective, 96 AMER. ECON. REV. 200, 203-4 (2006) (citing unions in seeking to 
explain “the nonrecovery of top capital incomes in the post-1945 period”). 
254  Michael Hiltzick, What Really Caused the Decline of American Unions?, L.A. TIMES, 
March 5, 2014. 
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Between the mid-1930s and the mid-1940s union power grew 
substantially, bolstered by the enactment of federal legislation that enabled 
workers to organize.
255
  Union membership among non-agricultural workers 
had risen to 35% in 1954 and strikes were considerably more frequent than they 
would be as the 20
th
 century drew to a close.
256
  Correspondingly, mid-20
th
 
century executives had to be mindful of maintaining the goodwill of organized 
labor in a way their counterparts in later decades did not.  This was potentially 
relevant for executive pay.  Companies entering labor negotiations probably 
would have preferred to avoid giving unions a significant bargaining chip by 
increasing executive compensation substantially.
257
  Union officials also likely 
would have been opposed as a matter of ideological principle to senior 
executives getting rich due to the hard work of modestly paid union 
members.
258
   
There is anecdotal evidence indicating that during the middle decades 
of the 20
th
 century union power influenced the setting of executive pay.  
Washington and Rothschild drew attention in the 1951 edition of their 
executive pay manual to the fact that it could be seen as “provocative of labor 
problems” for a chief executive to be paid $500,000 a year when the workers at 
the same company received $2000 per annum and said “The board of directors 
of today, before approving (executive pay), may well consider the effect upon 
the company’s next collective bargaining negotiation.”259  A study of the impact 
of taxation on business behavior published the same year suggested “[t]he 
probable effect on labor relations and union demands is undoubtedly a factor in 
any consideration of executive compensation” and quoted a senior executive as 
saying “[i]t is important not to let the executives get so much that they steam up 
the labor boys.”260  Similarly, a specialist in executive compensation suggested 
in 1970 “that cutting executive pay” could “be a good tactic if a company is 
preparing for union negotiations.”261   
A 2012 study by Frydman and Malloy of executive pay in the 1940s 
substantiates the theory that union power influenced executive pay patterns 
during middle decades of the 20
th
 century.
262
  They found a statistically 
significant negative correlation between executive compensation and 
                                                 
255  WYATT WELLS, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1945-2000:  CONTINUITY AND CHANGE FROM 
MASS PRODUCTION TO THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 18 (2003). 
256  Steven Greenhouse, Strikes at 50-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, January 29, 1996, A12.   
257  BOK, supra note xx, 105 (“Lavish executive earnings have already complicated union 
negotiations in more than one corporation.”) 
258  This was not always the case.  See e.g., Thomas C. Hayes, The “Front-End” Bonus 
Lure, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1980, D1, quoting an AFL-CIO spokesman as saying “We don’t give a 
hoot about executive pay levels as long as workers get their fair share.”   
259  WASHINGTON 1951,  supra note xx, at 9, 16. 
260  THOMAS H. SANDERS, EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON EXECUTIVES 100-1 (1951). 
261  Michael C. Jensen, Growing Trend:  Paychecks Shrink, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1970, 139.    
262  Frydman and Molloy, Pay Cuts, supra note xx, 241-42, 244-45, 247.     
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unionization that meant that while managerial pay was slightly higher in 
unionized firms at the beginning of the 1940s it was markedly lower in such 
firms by the end of the decade and remained so at least up to 1955.  A study 
focusing on data from the 1970s involving larger employers similarly found a 
negative association between unionization and CEO pay.
263
   
Just as the rise of union power likely was a constraint on executive pay 
during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, the subsequent marginalization 
of unions may well have contributed to the subsequent trend in favor of higher 
managerial compensation.  Executive pay, as Part II described, began to 
increase in earnest in the second half of the 1970s before gaining additional 
momentum in the 1980s.  Similarly, union influence began to decline markedly 
in the 1970s due to companies deploying robust union avoidance strategies and 
the process accelerated in the Reagan era as federally prompted deregulation of 
labor law weakened unions.
264
  By 1985, the percentage of employees who 
were union members was merely half of the 1954 figure (Fig. 2).  Hence, while 
union officials denounced the substantial increases in executive pay occurring 
in the 1980s,
265
 their views seemingly were doing little to impose checks on 
those setting managerial compensation. 
Figure 2:  Union Membership -- Non-agricultural Workers 
                                                 
263  See John DiNardo, Kevin F. Hallock, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Unions and 
Managerial Pay, NBER Working Paper No. 6318 (1997).  
264  MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 5-7, 
19-21, 53 (1987) (indicating, though, that longer term trends were highly relevant); BENNETT 
HARRISON AND BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE 
POLARIZING OF AMERICA 49-50, 100-3 (1988). 
265  See, e.g., John Holusha, Executive Bonuses Draw Union’s Fire, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
1984, A17; John Holusha, Union Angered by Pay of Top Chrysler Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
20, 1988, A21. 
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Source:  Mayer (2004)
 266
 
Although union pressure may have helped to flatten executive pay 
during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, it is doubtful organized labor 
played the decisive role.  Only once, in 1945, did union membership among 
private sector workers exceed the 35% level achieved in 1954.
267
  The fact that 
even at the peak of labor power only a minority of the workforce was unionized 
inevitably would have diluted whatever impact unions had on executive pay.  
The preferences of organized labor can have a spill-over effect to non-
unionized workplaces because the threat of unionization can prompt non-
unionized employers to grant pre-emptive concessions to staff and because 
unions publicly espouse social solidarity and advocate redistributive 
governmental policies.
268
  It is impossible to gauge the magnitude of this spill-
over effect.  Still, with union density peaking at 35%, even if unions 
discouraged increases in executive pay during the mid-20
th
 century they would 
only have been one of a variety of factors doing so.   
4. The Market for Managerial Talent  
If companies are competing intensely in the market for managerial 
talent to retain or recruit senior executives this should bolster the bargaining 
power of these executives and drive up managerial compensation.  
                                                 
266  GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 22-23 (2004). 
267  GOLDFIELD, DECLINE, supra note xx, 10 (providing annual statistics, 1930-78).     
268  Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage 
Inequality, 76 AMER. SOC. REV. 513, 517-19 (2011). 
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Correspondingly, developments affecting this market potentially explain why 
executive pay was flat during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century.  While the 
term “market for managerial talent” has been in use at least since the 1950s,269 
this market apparently operated at a significantly lower level of intensity during 
the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s than it did at the end of the 20
th
 century.  This in 
turn likely helps to explain historical trends concerning managerial 
compensation.   
Systematic empirical analysis of the market for managerial talent was 
lacking up to the end of the 1970s.
270
  Nevertheless, the available evidence 
indicates that the market was listless, at least compared to more recent times.  
During the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, companies would search quite 
intensely for managerial talent at entry level.
271
  At the very top of the 
managerial hierarchy, in contrast, “the average company [had] but scant 
recourse to the outside market for top officials.”272  Most top executives in large 
corporations were “company men” who joined their corporate employers during 
their 20s and then continued to work with the firm for at least a couple of 
decades before taking up their senior managerial posts.
273
   
Recruiting executives from other companies was by no means unknown 
in the mid-20
th
 century.  However, “mobile manager” bosses were usually only 
hired from a company operating in the same industry and were brought in 
because a company was in serious trouble or because a vacuum at the top had 
arisen due to a failure to grapple successfully with executive succession 
issues.
274
  Hence, a 1996 study of the American corporation as an employer 
during the 1950s and 1960s maintained “Managers… were generally treated by 
corporations as fixed assets who would enjoy long-term security and careers as 
long as they conformed to the expectations of the prevailing corporate culture 
that respected hierarchy and conformity….”275  Likewise, a 2006 analysis of 
governance of the modern corporation said of large firms during the mid-20
th
 
                                                 
269  See, for example, HERRYMON MAURER, GREAT ENTERPRISE:  GROWTH AND BEHAVIOR 
OF THE BIG CORPORATION 100 (1955). 
270  Dan Schneiderman, The Supply of and Demand for Executives in CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICER COMPENSATION 42, 42, 72 (Harold L. Wattel ed., 1978). 
271  Peter Cappelli, The Rise and Decline of Managerial Development, 19 INDUST. CORP. 
CHANGE 519, 520, 533-39 (2010).   
272  ROBERTS, EXECUTIVE, supra note xx, 148.   
273  MAURER, GREAT, supra note xx, 96-97; BURGESS, TOP, supra note xx, 180-81; From 
the Bottom Up, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1957, 35, 35.   
274  NEWCOMER, supra note xx, 133; BURGESS, TOP, supra note xx, 181; When the Boss is a 
“Foreigner”, BUS. WK.., Nov. 8, 1958, 107; The Mobile Managers, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1957, 49.      
275  Thomas A. Kochan, The American Corporation as an Employer:  Past, Present, and 
Future Possibilities in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 242, 244 (Carl Kaysen, ed., 1996). 
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century “[t]op jobs, including that of CEO, were usually awarded to those from 
within the company, often as a result of orderly succession planning.”276   
The 1970s was something of a transitional decade for the market for 
managerial talent in the same way it was for executive pay.  It has been said 
that “[f]rom the 1950s through the 1970s American executives looked a lot 
alike,”277 and that in the 1970s, “CEOs were usually ‘company men’ promoted 
from within”278 with “the vast majority of CEO openings [being] filled by 
incumbents rather than outside hires.”279  Nevertheless, at the CEO level the 
market for managerial talent was evolving in various ways that were potentially 
significant for executive pay.
280
  For instance, companies began looking for 
new chief executives more often, with turnover doubling between 1960 and 
1980.
281
  Moreover, forced exits became more prevalent.  The annual firing rate 
for CEOs doubled from 5% to 10% per annum between 1976 and 1981, 
prompting the New York Times to publish a story entitled “Why Big Business is 
Firing the Boss.”282   
Companies also became increasingly willing in the 1970s to shop 
externally for top managerial talent, particularly as the decade was drawing to a 
close.  According to a 1986 book on “headhunters” (executive search firms) 
“The greatest growth of the business occurred in the 1970s” due partly to the 
fact that the “Corporate appetite for outside management rose as the traditional 
promotion-from-within notion of advancement grew fusty and executives 
viewed ship-jumping mobility as a career strategy.”283  The 1981 New York 
Times article that discussed accelerating CEO turnover said top management 
                                                 
276  SMITH AND WALTER, supra note xx, 101.  See also RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR 
A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 61-64, 162 (2002); Peter 
Cappelli and Monika Hamori, The New Road to the Top, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2005, 25, 25. 
277  Cappelli and Hamori, New, supra note xx, 25.   
278  Robert J. Samuelson, The New Economic Warriors, WASH. POST, April 13, 2005, A17.    
279  Murphy, Executive, supra note xx, 267.  See also PATRICIA BONFIELD, U.S. BUSINESS 
LEADERS:  A STUDY OF OPINIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS 28-29, 31 (1980) (discussing data from a 
1978 questionnaire sent to the CEOs of large companies indicating that in terms of age, length of 
time working for the company and number of companies worked for the profile of chief 
executives indeed was little different in the 1970s than it had been in the 1950s or 1960s.    
280  Cappelli and Hamori, New, supra note xx, 25 (“There were hints throughout the 1970s 
that things were changing.”) 
281  William Ocasio, Political Dynamics and the Circulation of Power:  CEO Succession in 
U.S. Industrial Corporations, 1960-1990, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 285 (1994) (based on a random 
sample of 114 companies), discussed by Michael Useem, Corporate Restructuring and the 
Restructured World of Senior Management in BROKEN LADDERS:  MANAGERIAL CAREERS IN THE 
NEW ECONOMY 23, 31 (Paul Osterman, ed., 1996).   
282  Douglas Bauer, Why Big Business is Firing the Boss, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 1981, SM6.   
283  JOHN BYRNE, THE HEADHUNTERS 21 (1986).  See also Todd Fandell, Recruiting 
Executives is Big Business, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1979, Q3 (indicating that the number of 
executives hired each year with the assistance of executive search firms had increased from 4,000 
in the late 1960s to 16,000).    
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had “come to accept this rising transience in executive life.”284  A Chicago 
Tribune article from the same year indicated that companies were explaining 
and defending the rapid growth of the club of executives being paid more than 
$1 million per year on the basis they had to pay the going rate to attract and 
keep competent executives.
285
 
The most prominent illustration of changing attitudes was Chrysler’s 
1978 recruitment of Lee Iaccoca.  Reportedly “[t]he Chrysler board was 
desperate to get someone as experienced as Iacocca, and agreed to whatever he 
demanded.”286  Iacocca was paid a then-largely unprecedented “front-end 
bonus” of $1.5 million before turning up for work, a practice that Revlon began 
in 1974 when it paid the same amount to recruit as CEO an International 
Telephone & Telegraph executive.
287
   
The trend in favor of a more robust interaction between supply and 
demand in the market for managerial talent that began in the 1970s continued in 
the 1980s.  The Wall Street Journal, in a 1988 article that sought to explain 
why CEOs were “the richest hired hands in history” despite a stock market 
crash in 1987, cited the views of a “market forces camp” that contended 
“People at the chief-executive level are in short supply….” and indicated 
“Many companies say they must pay their chief executives handsomely lest 
others lure them away.”288  Chief executive turnover also continued to 
accelerate.  As of the mid-1990s, a CEO appointed after 1985 was three times 
more likely to be fired for a similar level of performance than one appointed 
before that date.
289
  Moreover, U.S. public companies were casting the net 
wider to find an executive who was the right fit.  A CEO appointed in 1990 was 
50% more likely to have been hired from outside the company than in 1970.
290
   
The 1980s market for managerial talent was not a model of theoretical 
perfection.  In 1985 Michael Jensen was arguing that senior executives of 
public companies were underpaid, thereby causing a brain drain at some major 
companies as talented individuals opted for fields such as investment banking, 
real estate and high-tech startups.
291
  He and Kevin Murphy asserted in the 1990 
Harvard Business Review article where they urged public companies to stop 
                                                 
284  Bauer, Why, supra note xx.   
285  Thompson, Advent of 7-Figure, supra note xx.    
286  SMITH AND WALTER, supra note xx, 105.   
287  Hayes, Front-End, supra note xx.  Iacocca received $1 million in 1979 and $500,000 in 
1980:  Stocks Sweeten Pay at the Top, BUS. WK., May 12, 1980, 56.    
288  Amanda Bennett, Top Dollar, WALL ST. J., March 28, 1988, 1.    
289  Thank You and Goodbye, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1999, 91 (citing a study by Rakesh 
Khurana examining 1300 instances where CEOs of Fortune 500 companies left their jobs).    
290  Are CEOs Worth Their Salaries?, WASH. POST, Oct 2, 2002, E1 (citing data compiled 
by economists Robert Frank and Philip Cook). 
291  William J. Powell, Could it be That Corporate Leaders are Underpaid?, BUS. WK., 
May 6, 1985, 87.    
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paying chief executives like bureaucrats “The CEO position is not a very risky 
job”292 and law professor Carl Bogus contended in 1993 “The CEO labor 
market is highly restricted….Most CEOs are promoted from below, and it 
surely is not necessary to offer a vice president a gargantuan sum to persuade 
him to accept the top job.”293  Nevertheless, it does seem that the market for 
managerial talent was operating with greater intensity during the 1980s and 
thus might help to explain why executive pay increased substantially during 
that decade.   
While changes to the market for managerial talent in the 1970s and 
1980s seemingly help to explain the executive pay “regime change” occurring 
then, this leaves open an important question:  Why did the market for 
managerial talent intensify?  The most likely explanation is that perceptions of 
the contribution top executives could make to corporate success evolved.  In 
particular, those responsible for appointing senior management and setting 
executive compensation increasingly believed that managerial talent was a 
scarce commodity for which paying premium prices in the form of higher 
executive pay was necessary and worthwhile.   
In the 1950s and 1960s there was a general consensus that while 
executive talent was important corporate success was not contingent upon a 
corporation having a dynamic leader at the helm.  In the mid-1950s, reputedly 
chief executives “of many companies…like[d] to remark jocularly that they are 
the most expendable men in their organizations.”294  A 1969 study of corporate 
executives said that top management usually “gets the job done…by mastering 
the ‘science of muddling through’” and attributed “[t]he relative indifference of 
the stock market” to the death or replacement of chief executives to shrewd 
investors deducing “changes at the top have little if any effect on the 
prospective earnings and growth of the company.”295  These conjectures were 
substantiated by a “ground breaking”296 1972 empirical study of 167 major 
public companies which indicated that once the strength of the economy, the 
industry in which a corporation was operating and various company-specific 
features were taken into account, executive “leadership” did very little to 
explain corporate performance.
297
 
Things seemed to be different in the 1980s.  Rakesh Khurana, in a 2002 
study of “charismatic CEOs” who had come to replace “the professional 
                                                 
292  Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 142.   
293  Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate 
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 29 (1993).    
294  MAURER, GREAT, supra note xx, 81.   
295  DAVID FINN, THE CORPORATE OLIGARCH 14-15, 18 (1969).   
296  Harris Collingwood, Do CEOs Matter?, ATLANTIC, June 2009, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/06/do-ceos-matter/307437/. 
297  Stanley Lieberson and James F. O’Connor, Leadership and Organizational 
Performance:  A Study of Large Corporations, 37 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 117 (1972). 
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Organization Man who toiled in anonymity,” said “the advent of this new breed 
of corporate leader” could be traced back to Iacocca’s 1978 appointment.298  
The New York Times picked up on the trend in a 1985 article entitled “A New 
Breed of CEO,” saying that while “until fairly recently the most obvious trait of 
the CEO was his relentless dullness” Iacocca and other leading chief executives 
eschewed “the old ways of managing and have brought new excitement to rusty 
companies.”299  Boards, in turn, apparently re-evaluated assumptions about the 
impact top executives could have on corporate performance and became 
prepared to adjust pay upwards to get and keep the right person in charge.
300
  
The stock market also was becoming sensitive to circumstances surrounding 
departures from office by CEOs, with share prices typically rising when a CEO 
left due to poor performance.
301
 
So long as perceptions of the contribution executives were making to 
corporate success were changing, even if managers did not “matter” more in 
reality, the shift in attitudes should have sufficed to jump start the market for 
managerial talent in a way that would have driven executive pay upward.
302
  
Nevertheless, there is empirical support for the proposition that chief executives 
were having a greater impact on corporate performance in the 1980s and 1990s 
than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.  Timothy Quigley and Donald 
Hambrick, following in the footsteps of the “seminal” 1972 study of the “CEO 
effect”, provide a unique historical perspective in a 2015 study where they filter 
out the strength of the economy, the nature of the industry corporations 
operated in and specific features of the firms in question to isolate the impact of 
CEOs between 1950 and 2009.
303
  They report that the CEO effect, which 
accounted for just under 10% of corporate performance in the 1950s and 1960s, 
hovered in the 10% to 12% range from 1970 until the mid-1980s before 
increasing to the 15% to 17% range as the 1990s drew to a close.
304
   
Taken together, then, there is quite strong evidence in favor of the 
proposition that the operation of the market for managerial talent accounted at 
                                                 
298  KHURANA, SEARCHING, supra note xx, 71.   
299  N.R. Kleinfield, A New Breed of C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1985, SM 76.   
300  David Leonhardt, For the Boss, Happy Days Are Still Here, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2001 
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setting executive pay could have prompted an increase in executive pay even if the market for 
managerial talent did not change dramatically in fact).    
303  Timothy J. Quigley and Donald C. Hambrick, Has the “CEO Effect” Increased in 
Recent Decades?  A New Explanation for the Great Rise in America’s Attention to Corporate 
Leaders, 36 STRAT. MGMT. J. 821, 822 (2015) (“there has been no consideration of the possibility 
that CEO effects can change systemically over time in a given country”).    
304  Id., 826-27.  
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least partly for the flatness of executive pay between 1940 and the mid-1970s 
and fostered the subsequent dramatic increases in managerial compensation.  
One point we have left open is why top management might have mattered more 
over time.  For present purposes it suffices to say that there were various 
reasons why those who set executive pay might have plausibly believed that the 
executive function had become more important, and more important in a way 
that justified higher compensation.  John Kotter, a Harvard Business School 
academic, offered in 1990 a helpful summary of factors that likely played a 
role: 
“[A]fter twenty-five to thirty years of relatively easy growth…the 
business world became more competitive, more volatile and tougher.  A 
combination of faster technological change, greater international competition, 
market deregulation, overcapacity in capital-intensive industries, an unstable oil 
cartel, raiders with junk bonds, and a demographically changing workforce all 
contributed to this shift.”305 
In sum, changing perceptions of the importance of corporate executives 
likely helped to foster from the late 1970s onwards a more robust market for 
managerial talent that in turn contributed to the dramatic rise in executive pay 
that began then.  One additional explanatory variable, however, needs to be 
taken into account to round out our survey of explanations for what “worked” 
during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, namely evolving norms within 
public companies relevant to the setting of executive pay.  We consider norms 
next.   
5. Norms 
Norms -- social rules not dependent upon on the government for 
promulgation or enforcement
306
 -- constitute a popular explanation for why 
executive pay held steady during the mid-20
th
 century.
307
  For instance, noted 
economist Paul Krugman wrote in his 2002 New York Times essay on equality 
that some economists believed the New Deal “imposed norms of equality of 
pay that persisted for more than 30 years….[that] began to unravel in the 1970s 
and have done so at an accelerating pace” and cited executive compensation as 
“Exhibit A for this view.”308  Frydman and Malloy have acknowledged in their 
                                                 
305  JOHN P. KOTTER, A FORCE FOR CHANGE:  HOW LEADERSHIP DIFFERS FROM 
MANAGEMENT 12 (1990).  Quigley and Hambrick speculate on various causes of the increased 
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empirical research on the historical development of executive pay that evolving 
norms impacting managerial compensation may explain why they found that 
changes to income tax only explained in a limited way managerial 
compensation trends from the 1940s onwards.
309
  Economists Xavier Gabaix 
and Augustin Landier, who in a widely cited 2008 article attributed a six-fold 
inflation adjusted increase in executive pay between 1980 and 2003 to a 
similarly sized increase in the market capitalization of the companies 
executives were running, said that social norms might well explain why the 
same pattern did not hold when executive pay was “flat” from the mid-1930s to 
the 1970s while firms were growing substantially.
310
  Piketty, having suggested 
in a co-authored 2006 article that norms may well have helped to keep 
“executive pay below market” during the mid-20th century,311 said in Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century that his tax analysis provided “the best explanation of 
the observed facts” but acknowledged that “social norms concerning executive 
pay directly influence the levels of compensation.”312 
While various observers have invoked norms to explain historical 
executive pay trends, the norms that were relevant during the middle of the 20
th
 
century have gone largely unspecified.  Krugman’s 2002 essay provides, 
however, a helpful departure point: 
“[I]t’s a matter of corporate culture.  For a generation after World War 
II, fear of outrage kept executive salaries in check.  Now the outrage is 
gone….a relaxation of social strictures….By the end of the 1990s, the executive 
motto might as well have been ‘If it feels good, do it.’”313    
“Outrage” is a term Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, well-known 
critics of current executive pay arrangements in U.S. public companies, have 
used to make the point that the ability of executives to use their power to 
extract “rents” by way of overly generous managerial compensation is “not 
unlimited.”314  Instead, “the need for board approval, and social sanctions…do 
place some constraints on compensation arrangements.”315  Bebchuk and Fried, 
writing in 2004, acknowledged that norms could help to predict the evolution of 
compensation but stressed that managerial power explained more effectively 
                                                 
309  Frydman and Saks, Executive, supra note xx, 2131-32; Frydman and Malloy, Does, 
supra note xx, 1435-36.  
310  Gabaix and Landier, Why, supra note xx, 76.  This concession did not preclude 
critiques of their research citing the chronology issue.  See, e.g., Bertrand, CEOs, supra note xx, 
137; Frydman and Saks, Executive, supra note xx, 2129-30.   
311  Piketty and Saez, Evolution, supra note xx, 204.   
312  PIKETTY, supra note xx, 512. 
313  Krugman, supra note xx.   
314  BEBCHUK &  FRIED, supra note xx, 64.    
315  Id. 
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“executive-friendly compensation practices that [had] developed and quickly 
spread during the last decade or two.”316   
Bebchuk and Fried’s reasoning implies that managerial power was 
greater in the 1980s and 1990s than it was beforehand – if it was not the 
“executive-friendly compensation practices” presumably would not have grown 
in importance.  Given that the proportion of independent directors on boards 
was higher during these decades than it was previously,
317
 it is unclear why 
there would have been any such trend.  Perhaps, instead, changes affecting 
norms in the boardroom, and corporate culture more broadly, opened the way 
for the more lucrative executive pay arrangements of which Bebchuk and Fried 
are critical.  There is evidence suggesting that might well have been the case.   
A perusal of contemporary sources indicates that norms in U.S. public 
companies, which in turn likely were shaped by society-wide values, probably 
did constrain executive pay during the middle of the 20
th
 century.  Washington 
and Rothschild, in the 1951 edition of their manual on executive compensation, 
said “The executive will damage his own cause if he insists on being given the 
ultimate dollar to which he believes himself entitled.”318  A 1955 study of 50 
leading U.S. corporations indicated “Moneygrubbing of substantial proportions 
is no longer possible for corporate managers…” and suggested that 
“maximizing the emoluments…of money-minded managers” would put a 
company “in danger of outraging the public, including its own employees and 
customers….”319  Business Week observed in 1960 that executives of public 
companies were eager not to be “pilloried as greedy, grasping, and 
domineering” and wanted to be “the man everyone likes.”320  
As the 1960s drew to a close a new generation of managerial talent was 
moving to the forefront that was less patient with “the rituals of the system” 
than the executives who had inculcated a “team first” ethos during the crisis 
conditions of the Depression and World War II.
321
  Specifically, with 
managerial compensation there were “some stirrings of unrest” among key 
businessmen who felt their pay should be increased at a faster pace.
322
  The 
basic norm structure, however, did not change materially.  As we have seen, 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith said in 1971 that executives were not paid as 
much as they might have been because of management’s self-restraint.323  Graef 
                                                 
316  Id., 76.   
317  Supra note xx and related discussion.   
318  WASHINGTON 1951, supra note xx, 17.   
319  MAURER, GREAT, supra note xx, 14, 91.   
320  Broadside at U.S. Management, BUS. WK., Feb. 20,1960, 129, 129 (citing views 
expressed by Cameron Hawley, an author of best-selling business novels, but saying there was 
considerable agreement with what he was saying). 
321  Arch Patton, Motivating Tomorrow’s Executives, MCKINSEY Q. March 1968, 20, 21.   
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Crystal said similarly in 1970 that “[c]ompensation practices in the U.S. bear an 
uncomfortable resemblance to those of Eastern Europe.  At these companies 
everyone ‘gets a little something’.”324   
By the mid-1980s matters had changed considerably.  “Superstars” who 
could dominate the activities in which they engaged and cash in accordingly 
were growing in importance throughout the economy,
325
 and attitudes in public 
companies were adjusting accordingly.  Edward Herman, a business school 
professor, was quoted in a 1984 newspaper article on executive pay as saying 
that while “huge salaries” were thought to be “slightly dubious,” “they’re 
obviously not dubious enough so they are not done,” with at least part of the 
explanation being “the free market is back….This is the age of laissez-faire.”326  
James Tobin, a distinguished economist, likewise cited in a 1984 interview a 
political shift rightwards to explain why “The undiluted pursuit of personal gain 
is more accelerated in our society” in a way that affected how businessmen 
thought about what they were doing.
327
  A New York Times article published the 
same year entitled “The Age of ‘Me-First’ Management” that focused on 
concerns that top executives were “losing sight of moral standards in the new 
frenzy to get rich” cited upheaval for executives caused by an unprecedented 
wave of hostile takeovers as a key reason “why some of the traditional 
constraints on corporate behavior appear to be unravelling.”328  The impact 
norms have on CEO pay depend on their substantive content rather than their 
mere existence.
329
  Correspondingly, it seems likely that changing views 
concerning the propriety of getting rich help to explain the executive pay 
“regime change” occurring as the 20th century drew to a close.   
Evolving norms may well have fostered the growth of executive pay in 
another way.  Given that executives, for various reasons, will prefer not to have 
their pay linked closely to the performance of the companies they manage, if 
those setting managerial compensation begin to prioritize a pay/performance 
link this will tend to drive upward aggregate executive pay.
330
  In the middle of 
the 20
th
 century, there certainly was awareness that with executives rarely 
owning more than a tiny number of shares in the companies they managed a 
failure to tie pay to performance could result in them being primarily “devoted 
                                                 
324  CRYSTAL, supra note xx, 33. 
325  Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AMER. ECON. REV. 845, 845 (1981); 
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to conserving present assets and ‘living out their terms.’”331  Nevertheless, tying 
pay to performance was not a top priority.  According to a 1955 study of top 
management in 50 large U.S. corporations, pride in the corporation and a job 
well done, not incentive-based pay, were the strongest motivating forces for 
senior executives.
332
  Crystal said in 1970 it would only be “the gutty company” 
that would de-emphasize executive salaries in favor of increased bonus 
opportunities even though top management would have the potential to receive 
higher total compensation.
333
  Reputedly as of 1975, for the “average CEO,” 
“the best way to get ahead was to ‘grow the company’ through diversifying 
acquisitions.  Most of the money came in the form of salary, and the bigger 
your company, the bigger your salary.”334   
Matters were changing at least to some degree in the 1980s as a small 
but growing number of companies adopted compensation plans that 
incorporated performance measures assumed to be much more closely allied to 
the creation of shareholder value than the standard measure of earnings per 
share.
335
  By the early 1990s, the idea that executive pay should be tied closely 
to shareholder outcomes was quickly becoming received wisdom in public 
companies.
336
  Jensen and Murphy’s 1990 Harvard Business Review article and 
the research underpinning it
337
 were influential in this process.
338
  As pay-for-
performance became a key governance objective in public companies the early 
1990s,
339
 higher levels of executive compensation would have logically 
followed, given managerial antipathy toward a riskier stream of income.
340
 
The public company norms relevant to the setting of executive pay 
were clearly different in the 1980s and the 1990s than they were in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but it cannot be taken for granted that the changes explain the end of 
the era of remuneration moderation prevailing during the mid-20
th
 century.  As 
we have seen, the trend in favor of higher executive pay likely can be traced 
back to the mid-1970s.  To the extent that this is accurate, if norms relevant to 
executive pay only changed in public companies in the 1980s and the beginning 
of the 1990s then other factors must account for the pivot away from executive 
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pay moderation.  It is even conceivable that causation worked in reverse, with 
the move toward higher executive pay helping to set the scene for prevailing 
norms to change.   
While it is possible that changes affecting executive pay may have 
reconfigured social norms rather than vice versa, there is some evidence that 
norms had begun to change in the mid- to late-1970s in a way that fostered the 
trend in favor of higher executive pay that prevailed thereafter.  Arch Patton, 
the executive pay expert, suggested in 1976 that “executive self-interest has 
replaced company loyalty to a substantial degree” and said this had helped “to 
raise the pay expectations of executives above any level sustainable without 
rampant inflation.”341  Derek Bok, in his 1993 study of executive and 
professional pay, acknowledged that the “Reagan revolution” of the 1980s 
lifted to the status of an “official ideology” a belief in individualism and 
admiration of successful entrepreneurs, but indicated that surveys of college 
students showed that making money was moving up the priority list as early as 
the start of the 1970s.
342
  Correspondingly, changing norms coincided with and 
likely contributed to the late 1970s shift away from the executive pay model 
that prevailed during the mid-20
th
 century.   
Caution should be used in drawing upon norms as an explanatory 
variable with respect to corporate governance.  This is because the term can 
potentially be defined so broadly that the behavior in question can be explained 
much more adequately by reference to incentives traditional economic analysis 
addresses.
343
  Nevertheless, it appears that a corporate culture underpinned by 
norms that discouraged “money grubbing” by top executives helps to explain 
why between the 1940s and the 1970s they were not paid as generously as their 
counterparts in later decades.    
VI. CONCLUSION 
Executive pay has been a highly controversial issue for the past quarter-
century.  Various reforms have been introduced as a response, seemingly to 
little avail.  Ironically, not long before the controversy began an executive 
compensation regime was in place in U.S. public companies during the mid-20
th
 
century that likely would have appealed to many of today’s critics of executive 
pay.  How was it that executive pay was modest by present-day standards prior 
to the introduction of reforms designed to address concerns that would 
subsequently arise?  We have addressed that question in this paper.  By 
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identifying “what worked” we are able to offer insights for those advocating 
executive pay reform today, albeit of a rather pessimistic nature.   
Tax provides at first glance the most obvious explanation for executive 
pay arrangements in place during the middle of the 20
th
 century.  The top 
marginal tax rates on income were eye-wateringly high compared with present 
levels, which might have been expected to keep executive pay down.  Thomas 
Piketty has indeed argued that restoring the tax regime in place in the U.S. 
during the mid-20
th
 century would do much to address concerns which currently 
exist about executive pay.  As we have shown, however, tax likely only had a 
modest impact on executive pay levels during the middle of the 20
th
 century.  
The tax “hit”, though substantial by present-day standards, was not robust 
enough to result in top executives leaving substantial sums “on the table.”   
Unions likely exerted some downward pressure on executive pay 
during the mid-20
th
 century, with unionized companies refraining from 
increasing managerial compensation substantially so as to reduce friction in 
labor negotiations with unions that had considerably more clout than they do 
presently.  Unions, however, never represented a majority of the workforce at 
any point in time, which would have diluted the impact they had on executive 
pay economy-wide.   
The market for managerial talent and norms within public companies 
do more to explain the mid-20
th
 century executive pay compression.  While by 
the end of the 20
th
 century CEOs were widely thought of as being genuine 
“difference makers” who would be worth paying generously and even poaching 
if they were the right person for the job, from the 1940s through the 1970s top 
executives were perceived of as mere bureaucrats with largely fungible talents 
and were paid accordingly.  Also, a “team first” ethos and a fear of being 
pilloried as greedy stemming from the crisis conditions of the Depression and 
World War II fostered the development of strong norms within companies 
against the awarding of highly lucrative executive pay.   
Could such historical conditions return so as to create a new era of 
executive pay moderation?  It is doubtful.  Pleas that have been made to today’s 
CEOs to leave money on the table voluntarily have fallen on deaf ears,
344
 so it 
seems improbable they will do much to lead by example.  Humility reputedly is 
“the flavor du jour” among senior executives right now.345  Still, it seems 
unlikely that CEOs will be thought of anytime soon as mere “organization 
men” meriting merely bureaucratic pay.  There is also little chance that a “team 
first” ethos will become sufficiently prevalent and potent in public companies 
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to drive executive pay downwards towards mid-20
th
 century levels.  While there 
is nostalgia for the industrial giants that dominated the U.S. (and world) 
economy during the middle decades of the 20
th
 century, Americans came to 
view such firms as bastions of soul-destroying conformism and ultimately 
preferred a more individualistic arrangement.
346
  There probably is little 
appetite for a return to the orderly but demoralizing uniformity of mid-20
th
 
century corporate life, which likely precludes norm-driven reform of executive 
pay.   
Perhaps Americans would be amenable to a return to the bureaucratic 
corporate ethos of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s if what can be referred to as 
“America’s Midcentury Moment”, characterized by substantial faith in 
government and widespread acceptance of a highly egalitarian income 
distribution, was to return.
347
  The Midcentury Moment, however, may well 
have been unique in U.S. history, following on from the deprivations of the 
Depression and the collective effort associated with World War II.  This likely 
is not a bad thing, given that these were traumatic events few, if any, would 
want to see repeated.  To draw matters together, in this paper we have identified 
what “worked” with executive pay in the sense that we have explained why 
managerial compensation remained relatively flat during the middle decades of 
the 20
th
 century in a way that regulation introduced since the early 1990s has 
not been able to replicate.  Putting into practice, however, the insights we have 
offered in a way that will satisfy today’s critics of executive pay may well be 
impossible.     
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